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ABSTRACT 
 
As cloud computing gains popularity, understanding the pattern and structure of its 
workload is increasingly important in order to drive effective resource allocation and pric-
ing decisions. In the cloud model, virtual machines (VMs), each consisting of a bundle of 
computing resources, are presented to users for purchase. Thus, the cloud context requires 
multi-attribute models of demand. While most of the available studies have focused on one 
specific attribute of a virtual request such as CPU or memory, to the best of our knowledge 
there is no work on the joint distribution of resource usage. In the first part of this 
dissertation, we develop a joint distribution model that captures the relationship among 
multiple resources by fitting the marginal distribution of each resource type as well as the 
non-linear structure of their correlation via a copula distribution. We validate our models 
using a public data set of Google data center usage. 
Constructing the demand model is essential for provisioning revenue-optimal config-
uration for VMs or quality of service (QoS) offered by a provider. In the second part of the 
dissertation, we turn to the service pricing problem in a multi-provider setting: given 
service configurations (qualities) offered by different providers, choose a proper price for 
 vii 
each offered service to undercut competitors and attract customers. With the rise of layered 
service-oriented architectures there is a need for more advanced solutions that manage the 
interactions among service providers at multiple levels. Brokers, as the intermediaries 
between customers and lower-level providers, play a key role in improving the efficiency 
of service-oriented structures by matching the demands of customers to the services of 
providers. We analyze a layered market in which service brokers and service providers 
compete in a Bertrand game at different levels in an oligopoly market while they offer 
different QoS. We examine the interaction among players and the effect of price compe-
tition on their market shares. We also study the market with partial cooperation, where a 
subset of players optimizes their total revenue instead of maximizing their own profit 
independently. We analyze the impact of this cooperation on the market and customers’ 
social welfare. 
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
2Cloud technologies have been successfully deployed in many scientific and business
domains, such as e-commerce, finance, web hosting, online social networks, video shar-
ing and many other domains. Big companies like Google, Facebook and Amazon offer
individual services as well as enterprise services to a wide range of customers. These
technologies provide high scalability, flexibility, and cost effectiveness to the emerging
computing requirements, and they are utilized by a wide variety of applications which
have various requirements and characteristics. Therefore, as cloud computing gains popu-
larity as a platform for providing access to huge pools of data and computational resources,
understanding its load structure is becoming ever more important.
The performance of any type of system cannot be determined without understanding
the workload. Cloud workloads consist of a collection of many applications and services
with their own specific performance and resource requirements. Because of the huge
scale of the computing resources (e.g., CPU, memory, network, and storage) provided,
and the correspondingly large volume of customers with diverse needs purchasing these
resources, efficient scheduling and allocation algorithms are essential (Beloglazov and
Buyya, 2010; Beloglazov et al., 2012). To address resource management, provisioning,
and to predict the performance of the system, it is important to have a deep understanding
of its properties and load structures. Having high fidelity workload models is a critical
ingredient in such resource management decisions. Such models are also important for
effective provisioning and procurement decisions within firms providing cloud resources,
and for determining the prices that should be charged in such environments (e.g., Amazon
EC2).
Analyzing the characteristics of workloads is a long-studied problem with application
to load balancing, system availability, failure, and process behavior. Workload charac-
terization consists of a description of the workload by means of quantitative parameters;
the goal is to show, apprehend and reproduce the behavior of the workload and its es-
3sential characteristics. The literature covering this topic originates in the 1960s (Walter
and Wallace, 1967; Rosin, 1965). Since then, this discipline has evolved with the evolu-
tion of computer architectures. The rise of time sharing systems and computer networks,
which has been coupled with huge improvement in processing power, led to new pro-
cessing requirements. These workloads consist of a mix of different types of applications
characterized by different performance requirements (Urgaonkar et al., 2005; Downey and
Feitelson, 1999; Cirne and Berman, 2001; Crovella, 2001; Gmach et al., 2007). Workload
characterization studies vary from clustering and classifying the requests (Arlitt et al.,
2001; Khan et al., 2012; Mishra et al., 2010) to mathematical and statistical models (Arlitt
and Williamson, 1996; Crovella, 2001; Cherkasova and Gupta, 2002) that can be used to
represent the typical workload of systems. However, most of these works have focused
on one specific attribute of workload (e.g., process CPU time, memory usage, or I/O op-
erations). To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work on the joint distribution
of resource usage. We believe that there is important structure in the correlation between
different attributes of demand, and therefore understanding the nature of the joint distri-
bution will significantly improve resource scheduling, allocation, and pricing algorithms,
among other uses for such models.
Contributions to Multi-attribute Workload Characterization: In the first part of this
thesis, we develop a multivariate model for computational resource usage. We propose to
use a more flexible distribution, the Burr XII, as our model of univariate demand. Hav-
ing modeled the individual attributes, we then combine them into a multi-attribute model
through the machinery of copulae (Sklar, 1959). Our approach provides an accurate model
that captures the dependency structure among the workload attributes, while preserving
their individual distributions. In this part of the thesis, we offer the following contribu-
tions:
4• A novel application of the Burr XII distribution to modeling the distributions of
individual workload attributes.
• The first effective demand models that capture the joint distribution over multiple
attribute types, built by applying copula methods to our marginal models.
• An application of these new tools to a large Google data set.
• Validation of this approach by employing a parametric bootstrapped Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on both the univariate and multi-variate data.
After constructing the multi-attribute demand model, which is essential for provision-
ing revenue-optimal configuration for Virtual Machines (VMs) or quality of service (QoS)
offered by a provider, in the second part of the dissertation, we turn to the service pricing
problem in a multi-provider setting: given service configurations (qualities) offered by
different providers, choose a proper price for each offered service to undercut competitors
and attract customers.
In today’s highly competitive Internet service market, service providers, in order to
survive, should offer their customers more flexibility in their QoS / price offerings to meet
a variety of customer needs and application requirements. Clearly, any successful solu-
tion for a service provider to stay in the market, not only depends on supporting new and
updated technologies, but also involves economic aspects. However, pricing the services
of the network, even without considering quality differentiation, is a challenging problem
that involves different issues. There have been many studies that attempted to address
these issues with or without considering differentiated QoS (MacKie-Mason and Varian,
1995; Varian, 1996; Kelly, 1997; He and Walrand, 2005a; McKnight and Bailey, 1998;
Shakkottai and Srikant, 2006; Neely, 2009) . Pricing approaches include Paris Metro pric-
ing (Odlyzko, 1999), congestion pricing (Hande et al., 2010; de Palma and Lindsey, 2011),
rate-reliability pricing (Lee et al., 2006), and fairness pricing (Kelly et al., 1998). On the
5other hand, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, such as computational clouds
and recursive networks (Wang et al., 2014), network virtualization such as CABO (Feam-
ster et al., 2007), and service brokerage companies such as Google’s “Project Fi” (Google,
2015), there is a need for more advanced solutions that manage the interactions among ser-
vice providers at multiple levels. Indeed, the evolution of the Internet is now motivating
not only the understanding and formulation of a new architecture, but also the reconsider-
ation of the economic relationships among providers and agents, especially in the context
of a layered network. While there has been dramatic success in infrastructure research,
there has been less work related to the pricing of a service-oriented Internet.
The ultimate goal in service-oriented architectures and network virtualization is to de-
couple the services offered by network providers from those of service providers which
yield the layered structure of the network. Also, brokers as the intermediaries between
clients and lower-level providers, play a key role in improving the efficiency of service-
oriented structures by matching the demands of clients to the services of providers. They
can downgrade or upgrade a service by sharing it among customers or by combining sev-
eral services to satisfy customers’ demand. For example, in “Project Fi” (Google, 2015),
Google offers a flat data rate of $10 per gigabyte of data that is provided by either T-
Mobile or Sprint, i.e., Google selects the best network provider based on factors such as
coverage and performance, thus adding flexibility and providing the best service to its cus-
tomers. Furthermore, Project Fi customers can manage their costs based on their monthly
needs. This is in contrast to network providers, e.g., T-mobile and Sprint, which offer their
customers fixed data plans regulated by a static contract.
Contributions to Multi-layered Service Pricing: In the second part of the thesis, we
propose a two-layered network market in which service brokers and service providers
compete at different levels in an oligopoly to maximize their profit. In our settings, bro-
kers can pay a cost to upgrade or downgrade the service that they buy from (lower-level)
6providers so as to offer a new service to the market (customers). The broker incurs costs
when adapting a lower-level service as it expends resources to either enhance the service
extended to its customers (e.g., by employing delay-jitter reduction or capacity allocation
techniques over a best-effort service) or degrade it (e.g., by multiplexing client demands
over a guaranteed service). We consider the competition among providers and among
brokers separately, while brokers impose some preference constraints on (infrastructure,
cloud or service) providers. We also consider conditions that may lead to a monopoly
market and study how players act under such conditions. We model service quality differ-
entiation after Hotelling’s location model — (Hotelling, 1929), where firms compete and
price their products in only one dimension, geographic location. In our model, brokers
and (lower-level) providers compete and price their services based on the quality of the
service that they offer. Our numerical results show that more service differentiation gen-
erally yields more profit for all players. However, besides quality differentiation, the cost
that brokers assume also plays an important role and they should forgo maximum differ-
entiation to reduce the cost, which leads to higher profit. Also, as the number of brokers
increases, the market gets more competitive and prices drop further.
The underlying assumption in the first part of our service pricing work is that play-
ers are completely non-cooperative entities. This profit-seeking nature of players leads to
selfish behaviors that may have negative consequences and reduce their profits. So, it is
reasonable to assume that a subset of players discuss possible cooperative strategies, form
coalitions, and take actions that are beneficial to all members of the group. Coalitional
games have been widely explored in different disciplines such as economics and political
sciences. Recently, cooperation has emerged as a new strategy that has a huge impact
on improving performance from the physical layer (La and Anantharam, 2004; Mathur
et al., 2008) up to the network layer (Han and Liu, 2008). The application of cooperative
game theory in network studies has mostly focused on the traffic routing problem, net-
7work traffic, and network connectivity (Saad et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2006;
van den Nouweland, 2005; Epstein et al., 2007; Albers, 2009; Blocq and Orda, 2012;
Hu et al., 2015). In our work, we also consider a two-layered market in which a subset
of the brokers cooperate with each other rather than compete. Specifically, a new broker
entering the market cooperates with one of the existing brokers in competition with the
other broker(s). We study the impact of this cooperation on the quality that the new broker
chooses, the other brokers’ prices, and also customers’ utility. While in most situations,
collaboration improves the cooperating brokers’ profit but with a negative impact on cus-
tomers’ utility, there are cases where both coalition brokers and customers benefit from the
cooperation. In these cases, cooperation of two brokers divides the demand between the
service providers in such a way that causes tougher competition, and consequently leads
to lower prices, at the service providers’ level.
Organization of the Thesis: The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2,
we cover related work and state of the art for both workload characterization and service
pricing. In Chapter 3, we first study the Burr XII and Copula distributions as the machinery
needed to create multi-attribute models. Then we propose an effective demand model
that captures the joint distribution over multiple attribute types, built by applying copula
methods to our marginal models. We fit our models to an existing data set of Google and
evaluate the effectiveness of our models using one of the goodness of fit (GoF) tests. Using
the Burr XII distribution makes our marginal models of each attribute have better fidelity
than those used previously. The result of this chapter has been published in (Ghasemi and
Lubin, 2015).
Then in Chapter 4, we propose a new approach to modeling price competition in multi-
layered service oriented architectures. In our model, providers and brokers, offer differen-
tiated services and compete in a non-cooperative game in a two layered network market.
Providers and brokers, as players, compete in a Bertrand game at each level to maximize
8their profit. We derive the price and demand functions for two brokers in the market and
then generalize the market for more than two brokers. Then, we observe the effect of com-
petition among brokers on the service quality that they choose to offer and their prices. We
also analyze the action of players under a monopoly setting. The results of this chapter
has been published in (Ghasemi and Matta, 2016; Ghasemi et al., 2016).
We proceed with considering cooperation among a subset of brokers in Chapter 5. In
a non-cooperative game, all players try to maximize their own profit independently. When
a new broker enters the market, the competition gets more intense and there is a huge
drop in the profit of existing brokers. In this chapter, we study the market in a situation
where the entering broker cooperates with one of the existing players. We compare the
profit and price of players with the non-cooperative game. We also consider the effect of
cooperation on the customers’ welfare. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and summarizes its
contributions.
9Chapter 2
Related Literature
10
2.1 Related Literature on Workload Characterization
Workload characterization is a well-established problem that plays an important roll in
many performance studies with application to resource provisioning, power management,
load balancing, security mechanism and market strategies (Calzarossa and Serazzi, 1993;
Calzarossa et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2005; Calzarossa et al., 2016). The literature
covering this topic originates in the 1960s where computers were mainframes and their
workloads were batch jobs and transactions.
The advent of time sharing systems and computer networks which coupled with the
supercomputer and grid, urges researchers to address load characterization and system
requirements to improve the system performance in many application domains. These
domains include but are not limited to web workload (Pitkow, 1998; Williams et al., 2005;
Mahanti et al., 2009), online social network workload (Farahbakhsh et al., 2013; Jiang
et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2010), media services workload (Islam et al., 2013; Almeida
et al., 2001; Van Zwol, 2007), mobile device workloads (Falaki et al., 2010; Bo¨hmer et al.,
2011) and cloud workloads (Calzarossa et al., 2016; Kochut and Beaty, 2007; Azmandian
et al., 2011).
Process CPU usage (or runtime on a fixed processor type) is typically a key feature
of computational loads. In one of the earliest studies, (Walter and Wallace, 1967) and
(Rosin, 1965) presented a study based on data for more than 10, 000 jobs run at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Computing Center. They found that the shape of CPU process time is
skewed and used a simple exponential distribution to model it. Such work continued into
the 1970s, for example (Agrawala et al., 1976) presented three simple models of system
workload, validating their cluster-based probabilistic models on the university of Mary-
land Univac 1108. However, In the late ’80s and early 90’s experimental evidence showed
a very common situation in data traces where there were many small jobs and a few long
jobs. This evidence led (Leland and Ott, 1986) and (Harchol-Balter and Downey, 1997)
11
to show that process life distributions are actually heavy-tailed and better modeled by a
Pareto distribution.
Process runtime is not the only workload property that follows heavy-tailed distribu-
tion. (Crovella, 2001) argues that the evidence for heavy-tailed distributions is widespread
for some properties of computer systems and networks. Some of the workload properties
that follow heavy-tailed distributions are file sizes (Downey, 2001), Internet traffic flow
sizes (Paxson and Floyd, 1995; Shaikh et al., 1999) and the distribution of request sizes of
web server load (Barford and Crovella, 1998; Crovella and Bestavros, 1997).
For memory also there are studies that show linear relationships with job sizes and
requested memory (Parsons and Sevcik, 1996; Li et al., 2004a). Furthermore, (Setia et al.,
1999; Feitelson, 1997; Chiang and Vernon, 2001) report that most of the jobs have small
memory requirements and only a few of the long-running jobs have large memory require-
ments.
While most of these works have focused on one specific property of workload, to the
best of our knowledge there is no existing work on the parametric joint distribution of
resource usage. However, there are studies that deal with the analysis of the components
in the multidimensional space of workload attributes by means of clustering techniques.
Clustering techniques are usually applied to identify groups of workload components with
similar behaviors. (Agrawala et al., 1976) is one of the earliest study which models a
workload of a dual processors system which is used in a scientific environment. Their
clusters are characterized by parameters like CPU time, number of I/O accesses per device
type, number of files, and number of job steps. In recent studies the statistical properties
of the workload are analyzed to classify cloud applications in terms of both quantitative
(i.e., resource requirements) and qualitative (i.e., task events) attributes. (Chen et al., 2010;
Mishra et al., 2010; Beaumont et al., 2016) do correlation analysis between job semantics
and job behaviors and classify jobs based on their CPU and memory usage. Their results
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show that tasks in the clusters are either of short duration or of long duration, i.e., they are
bimodal in nature but most of the tasks have short duration. According to them resources
are consumed most of the times by long duration’s tasks.
Compared to the existing works, our study provides a parametric probabilistic dis-
tribution for CPU and memory usage of jobs separately and as a joint distribution. We
believe that understanding the dependency structure between resources will greatly aid
performance of resource management tools and decisions.
2.2 Related Literature on Internet Services Pricing
Game theory has been applied to a wide range of networking problems to capture the in-
teraction of (selfish or cooperating) players seeking a maximum value for their (private)
utility. The assumption is that every step (or move) toward the maximization of such utility
impacts the utility of other players in the model (or game). Given the connectivity nature
of a network of agents, a wide range of networking mechanisms have been modeled with
game theory; from the physical ISO-OSI layer with transmission power utility games (Chi-
ang et al., 2008) or spectrum sharing (Bennis et al., 2009; Shetty et al., 2009) to Medium
Access Control (Zander, 1991) to routing and packet forwarding (Orda et al., 1993; Ca-
galj et al., 2005), both in wireless (MacKenzie and DaSilva, 2006) and wired (Nisan et al.,
2007) scenarios.
Aside from modeling multi-agent protocol behaviors and the various resource alloca-
tion mechanisms, markets and pricing equilibrium have further exemplified the synergy
between game theory (and economics) and networked (cloud) systems (Papadimitriou,
2001; Ma and Huang, 2012). In particular, network economics has been a very active
research area in which both pricing and market regulation strategies have been studied
widely. However the exponential growth of Internet services in hierarchical (i.e., multi-
layer) markets requires a deeper study of new market features that will become available.
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One of the earliest work on layered networks, (Gong and Srinagesh, 1997) identifies and
discusses some difficult economic problems related to resale and complexity of compe-
tition among multiple owners of physical networks. The authors study some integrated
and unintegrated telecommunication companies and the services that they offer to create
differentiated products to cover their costs. The paper does not suggest any specific ar-
chitecture or policies for pricing, but discusses the need for a full economic model that
features oligopolistic competition among a few large companies that invest in the physical
infrastructure as well as firms at the virtual network level.
Pricing for single-level games has been studied extensively. He and Walrand (He and
Walrand, 2005b) consider a self-regulated service model, where market demand deter-
mines the service quality, i.e., higher demand causes more congestion and consequently
less quality. In their model, there is a single Internet Service Provider (ISP) who offers two
classes of service with different prices to manage congestion. They show that when the
price does not match the service quality, the system may end up in an equilibrium similar
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Shetty et al. (Shetty et al., 2009) compare the revenue
of a monopolist operator with and without service differentiation. They show that the rev-
enue is higher when an operator offers two different services. Both Li et al. (Li et al.,
2004b) and Fulp and Reeves (Fulp and Reeves, 2001) provide a traffic- sensitive pricing
scheme for differentiated network services. The focus of (Fulp and Reeves, 2001) is on
maximizing the profit of the service provider who buys a differentiated service connection
from domain brokers and sells it to users, whereas (Li et al., 2004b) focuses on providing
economic incentives to users so as to maintain a given level of traffic load. Also, (Gibbens
et al., 2000; Shu and Varaiya, 2003; Shetty et al., 2010) have studied the supporting of
various level of quality of network service in the internet. Their studies show that the
increase in the number of service classes leads to lower prices and less profit.
Two-level games have also been studied more recently. Our work is inspired by
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Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2010) and Nagurney and Wolf (Nagurney and Wolf, 2014).
They propose an economic model for the interaction and competition among service
providers, network providers and users. Both studies develop a two-stage (Stackelberg)
game, where service providers compete in a Cournot game, and network providers com-
pete in a Bertrand game. In (Nagurney and Wolf, 2014), the authors generalize the market
of (Zhang et al., 2010) by considering different demand markets served by any number of
service providers and any number of network providers in which network providers offer
different levels of service quality. Although our work shares the same two-level game
approach with (Zhang et al., 2010) and (Nagurney and Wolf, 2014), in our framework we
consider users, and providers at each level (viewed as “users” of lower-level providers),
having service preference based on quality and price, where at each level providers com-
pete in a Bertrand game (i.e., competition on price). Also, Zhang et al. (Zhang et al.,
2010) study a market with two service providers and two network providers offering the
same level of service quality. Our model however is more realistic as we consider a market
where players at both levels may offer different qualities of service.
Different game-theoretic models for differentiated service markets of users and service
providers have also been proposed (Ma, 2014; Baslam et al., 2012; Nagurney et al., 2015;
Semret et al., 1999). In (Nagurney et al., 2015), the authors propose a game-theoretic
model where service providers compete with duration-based contracts for differentiated
service. (Baslam et al., 2012) considers a joint price-quality market with a Stackelberg
game where providers are leaders and users are followers. In their model, providers con-
sider the migration of users when setting their price and quality. In another study, Semret
et al. (Semret et al., 1999) consider a retail market where, for each network, three types of
players interact: a service provider, a broker and a set of end-users; their main contribu-
tion is a decentralized auction-based bandwidth pricing for differentiated Internet services.
They show that Progressive Second Price1 provides a stable pricing in a market where ser-
1PSP is a natural generalization of second-price auctions in the case of sharing an arbitrarily divisible
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vice providers receive most of the profits, and the brokers’ profit margin is small. Finally,
the authors in (Ma, 2014) study a congestion-prone market with usage-based pricing. They
propose a model for users’ preference over their value and sensitivity to congestion, and
based on such model they characterize the market share and optimal price for providers.
Our model considers multi-layer differentiated service games where the service ob-
tained from the lower level can be upgraded or downgraded, and hence can be sold to the
higher level provider. In our analysis, we apply price constraints when players’ optimal
price would lead to losing market share, and we also give insights on how players should
then update their price.
2.2.1 Cooperative Games
Cooperative games were introduced in the 1940s (Neumann et al., 1944), and are consid-
ered an important branch of game theory. Since then, many solutions for these games have
been proposed (Nash, 1953; Gillies, 1953; Ransmeier, 1942; Shapley, 1953). Although
the Internet is considered as a set of autonomous agents in game theoretic studies, there are
studies that consider coalitions among players and study the effect of cooperation on the
problem at hand. Concepts and principles from cooperative game theory have enriched
our understanding of resource allocation in wireless networks (Ng and Yu, 2007; Hong
et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2012), spectrum sharing among users (Manna
et al., 2011; Duan et al., 2014), and transmission at the physical layer (Han and Poor,
2009; Mathur et al., 2006).
Another line of work studies the effect of cooperation among content providers and
network service providers, and the profit sharing mechanism, on resource pricing (Cao
et al., 2002; Freedman et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2009). Most of these stud-
ies either use Shapley value (Roth, 1988; Winter, 2002) or Nash bargaining game (Nash Jr,
1950) to model cooperation in network resource pricing. Shapley value emphasizes rev-
resource (Lazar et al., 1998).
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enue distribution based on weighted marginal contribution of each entity in a group, while
Nash bargaining emphasizes the Pareto optimal property and symmetry. In (Cao et al.,
2002), network users are assumed to have the same preference, and therefore the pric-
ing problem degenerates to a game between a single user and an ISP. The authors show
that Nash bargaining makes the system converge to the Pareto optimal point. The authors
in (Ma et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2010) study the economics of traditional transit providers
and content providers and apply cooperative game theory to find an optimal settlement
between these entities. They use Shapley value profit distribution for a better engineered
Internet. In (Freedman et al., 2008), price theory is used to design a peer-assisted content
distribution system that manages ISP resources more efficiently. The authors in (Shakkot-
tai and Srikant, 2006) consider the interaction among ISPs at different levels – local ISPs
and transit ISPs – and show that for local ISPs, there exists an optimal scenario where
all ISPs peer with each other and jointly maximize their profit. The authors in (Jiang
et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2014) examine the interplay between traffic engineering and content
distribution, and study the relation between content providers (CP) and network service
providers. They show how ISPs and CPs can cooperate, and why such cooperation not
only guarantees a fair profit distribution among providers, but also helps improve the eco-
nomic efficiency of the network system. In our study, only a subset of players (brokers)
cooperate with each other and they are focused on maximizing their own total revenue
while competing with the rest of players.
Part I
Multi-attribute Demand
Characterization
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Chapter 3
Multi-Attribute Demand Characterization
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3.1 Introduction
As cloud computing has gained popularity as a platform for providing access to huge
pools of data and computational resources, understanding its load structure has become
ever more important. Because of the huge scale of the computing resources (e.g., CPU,
memory, network, and storage) provided, and the correspondingly large volume of cus-
tomers with diverse needs purchasing these resources, efficient scheduling and allocation
algorithms are essential (Beloglazov and Buyya, 2010; Beloglazov et al., 2012). Hav-
ing high fidelity workload models is a critical ingredient in such resource management
decisions. Such models are also important for effective provisioning and procurement de-
cisions within firms providing cloud resources, and for determining the prices that should
be charged in such environments (e.g. EC2).
Many methods for constructing workloads are described in the literature. However,
most of this work has focused on one specific attribute of demand (e.g., process CPU time,
memory usage, or I/O operations). To the best of our knowledge there is no existing work
on the joint distribution of resource usage. We believe that there is important structure in
the correlation between different attributes of demand, and that therefore an understanding
the nature of the joint distribution will significantly improve allocation, scheduling and
pricing algorithms among other uses for such models.
Accordingly, in this chapter, we develop a multivariate model for computational re-
source usage. Moreover, as part of out model we propose to use a more flexible distribu-
tion, the Burr XII, as our model of univariate demand. We will show that this model has
significantly more power to capture real-world usage patterns than the models used to date
in the literature. Having modeled the individual attributes, we then combine them into a
multi-attribute model through the machinery of copulae (Sklar, 1959).
Copulae are an elegant way to build and fit complex joint distributions that have
been used to great effect in finance, but which have not been used in computational de-
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mand modeling. By employing this method we have been able to accurately handle an
otherwise-intractable modeling problem. In this work, we focus on the bivariate case,
specifically capturing the joint demand for CPU and memory, typically the two most im-
portant resource types. We then validate our approach based on a public data set from
Google (Google, 2011) that contains 29 days of workload data from a large production
cluster. Using this data, we examine a large number of models from the family we pro-
pose, and demonstrate the effectiveness of a particular model that combines Burr XII
marginals with the Clayton and Frank copulae.
The proposed model can be directly generalized to more resource types, though we
are limited by our data in doing so here. Our approach provides an accurate model that
captures the dependency structure among the workload attributes, while preserving their
individual distributions. In this chapter we offer the following contributions:
• A novel application of the Burr XII distribution to modeling the distributions of
individual workload attributes (Section 3.2.2).
• The first effective demand models that capture the joint distribution over multiple
attribute types, built by applying copula methods to our marginal models (Sec-
tion 3.2.3).
• An application of these new tools to a large Google data set (Section 3.3.1).
• Validation of this approach by employing a parametric bootstrapped Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on both the univariate and multi-variate data (Section 3.4)
3.2 Theory and Models
Here we provide the machinery needed to create multi-attribute models and apply them to
our setting.
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3.2.1 Preliminaries
Given a set of size d of correlated random variables Xi,∀i ∈ D = {1, . . . , d}, we define
the joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) as F (~x), as the probability that Xi ≤
xi ∀i ∈ D where ~x ∈ Rd. We then define the joint probability density function (PDF) in
the usual way as:
f(~x) =
∂F
∂X1 . . . ∂Xd
∣∣∣∣
~x
The marginal density function for variable Xi is then simply its distribution without
regard to all the other variables , or formally:
fi(xi) =
∫
~xj<i
. . .
∫
~xk>i
f(〈~xj;xi; ~xk〉)d~xjd~xk
Where 〈·; ·〉 represents vector composition. Here the integration ranges over all the dimen-
sions other than i, the marginal being specified. We will denote the corresponding CDF as
Fi( ~X).
Complex multivariate distributions (e.g. outside the normal) are notoriously hard to
model and fit. The classical way to show dependency of variables in a multivariate dis-
tribution is to assume they are linearly dependent and estimate correlation coefficients.
However, this assumption restricts the type of association between the marginals to be lin-
ear. Further, this has the odd property that while the independence of two random variables
will induce 0 correlation, 0 correlation does not in general imply independence (Embrechts
et al., 2002). Consequently, if we can capture the dependence between random variables
more fully, we not only avoid these problems specifically, but also potentially obtain a
huge increase in fidelity for our model.
To do this, we turn to the formalism of copulae as a tool to provide for our multi-variate
analysis. Copulae enable the construction of a model that captures the various marginal
distributions of a empirical data separately from the “coupling” of these marginals. As
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we shall see, this separation makes both forming and fitting a complex model far more
tractable.
The word copula was first introduced by (Sklar, 1959) in a theorem that described the
necessary properties of functions that “join together” one dimensional marginal distribu-
tions to create multivariate distributions. Concretely, a copula function C is a multivariate
distribution defined on the unit hypercube [0, 1]d with uniform marginals:
C(u1, u2, . . . , ud) = Pr[U1 ≤ u1, U2 ≤ u2, . . . , Ud ≤ ud]
where Ui ∼ Uniform(0, 1), i ∈ D, along with the boundary conditions that:
[ui = 0] =⇒ [C(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , ud) = 0] ∀i ∈ D ∧ u 6=i ∈ R
[u6=i = 1] =⇒ [C(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , ud) = ui] ∀i ∈ D ∧ ui ∈ R
Furthermore, according to Sklar’s theorem (Sklar, 1959), if CDF F (~x) is a continuous
multivariate distribution, a unique copula function C : [0, 1]d → [0, 1] exists such that
F (~x) = C(F1(x1), F2(x2), . . . , Fd(xd))
for continuous marginal distributions Fi(xi). Indeed, copula C links the marginal distri-
butions together to create a multivariate distribution. In theory, such a copula function
can be arbitrarily complicated. We seek a simple parametric copula that fits our data well.
Next, we describe several such copulae from literature that we evaluate in Section 3.4.2
The Gaussian copula, which is based upon the multivariate normal distribution, is one
such choice for modeling dependence. The Gaussian copula is defined as:
CΦ(u1, u2, . . . , ud) = Φ(F
−1
1 (u1), F
−1
2 (u2), . . . , F
−1
d (ud),Σ)
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Archimedean
Copula Generator Function ψ
Gumbel
Copula ψ(ui) = exp(−(
n∑
i
logλ(
1
ui
))1/λ)
Frank
Copula ψ(ui) = logλ(
n∏
i
(λui − 1)
(λ−1)n−1 + 1)
Clayton
Copula ψ(ui) = (
n∑
i
u
1/λ
i − 1)−λ
Table 3.1: Several Archimedean copulae and their formulae
where Φ is multivariate normal CDF, Σ is a correlation matrix describing the correla-
tion between the different variables, and the F1, F2, . . . , Fd are arbitrary but well-defined
marginal distributions.
Another important class of copula functions are the Archimedean copulae. Archi-
medean copulae have simple parametric form that allows for a variety of different depen-
dence structures. The general form of an Archimedean copula is
CA(u1, u2, . . . , ud) = ψ
−1(ψ(u1) + ψ(u2) + · · ·+ ψ(ud))
where ψ is a decreasing univariate function known as generator of the copula, carefully
chosen such that CA will obey the copula properties identified above. The Clayton, Gum-
bel and Frank copulae are each defined by a specific choice of Archimedean generator, as
provided in Table 3.1, where λ is a free parameter that is available for fitting.
Joint dependence structure has been modeled using copulae in many fields, including
reliability engineering, finance, and risk management. Yet, these powerful copula-based
methods are unfamiliar to many researchers, and there is little literature comparing the
efficiency of various copulae in real settings. This is unfortunate considering there is evi-
dence that using the wrong copula model can cause errors with dramatic consequences, as
occurred in the 2007-8 financial crisis (Salmon, 2009). A paper by Li (Li, 2000) on the use
24
of Gaussian copula in finance had been widely adopted by financial institution in model-
ing the price of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). However the Gaussian model has
weak tails that underestimate the probability of joint events (in this case mortgage failure),
which contributed to the poor decisions made by the banks in the crisis. Had the models
correctly captured the tail dependence structure, some of the financial disaster might have
been avoided. We view this cautionary tale as added impetus for the careful evaluation we
perform of the various possible copula models, lest we repeat this modeling mistake. We
add that despite this failure, the Gaussian model remains attractive for its simplicity and
is in fact valid in context when tail dependence is modest. It is therefore important for us
to include as a possible model in our analysis (although as will be apparent in Section 3.4,
we do ultimately reject it in our setting).
3.2.2 Modeling the Marginal
Before building our full multivariate model, we must first ensure that we have accurately
described the marginals in our domain, that is, that we have appropriate univariate models
for each of the demand attributes. Therefore, we next consider several distributions of
demand for specific resource types including a new one not appearing elsewhere in the
literature.
Process CPU usage (or runtime on a fixed processor type) is typically a key feature
of computational loads. Early studies show that the general shape of the process run-
time distribution is skewed (Walter and Wallace, 1967; Rosin, 1965), i.e., there are a lot
of short jobs and a number of long jobs. These papers use a simple exponential PDF
to model process lifetime : f(x) = 1
θ
ex/θ, where θ is a scale parameter. Later (Leland
and Ott, 1986) and (Harchol-Balter and Downey, 1997) showed that process life distri-
butions are actually heavy-tailed and better modeled by a Pareto distribution, with PDF
function f(x) = ξxξm/x
ξ+1 where xm is location parameter and ξ is a shape parameter.
Later, (Lublin and Feitelson, 2003) fitted job runtimes to a novel hyper-Gamma distribu-
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tion which has 6 parameters.
For the creation of distributed scheduling algorithms, load sharing and the optimiza-
tion of performance it is also essential to know the memory requirements of jobs. There
are many studies of memory allocation and linear correlation analysis of it with respect
to CPU usage. (Parsons and Sevcik, 1996), as well as (Li et al., 2004a) studied work-
load characteristics, including job size and memory usage, and linear relationships among
them. (Chiang and Vernon, 2001) analyzed six one-month production workload traces
from the 2000-nodes array at the National Computational Science Alliance. They found
that a large fraction of the jobs have a very small memory usage per processor (under
32M) while just about 5% of jobs have memory usage greater than 1 GB per processor.
They also showed that there is a significant correlation between requested memory and
requested number of processors. This study has been corroborated by a similar one by (Li
et al., 2004a) who also found a significant linear correlation between memory usage and
runtime. However, none of these studies goes beyond simple linear correlation to model
the full joint distribution over demand attributes as we do.
Overall, although there has been work on memory usage, management, and schedul-
ing, there has not been to our knowledge a good model of the distribution of memory
usage. In our own work, we have found empirically that the distribution of CPU usage
(and memory) are not always decreasing, and a skewed bell-type structure is in fact possi-
ble. When confronted with such a bell shape, the first distributions one typically considers
for a model are the normal and lognormal distributions. However, these are exponential
family distributions which will not fit heavy tailed data well. Because we believe the
distribution may be heavy tailed, we additionally consider a somewhat more esoteric dis-
tribution, the Burr XII (Burr, 1942), also known as the Singh-Maddala distribution. The
Burr XII distribution can fit a wide range of empirical data, as different values of its pa-
rameters cover a broad class of skewness and kurtosis. Hence, it is used in various fields
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such as finance, hydrology, and reliability to model a variety of data types. We choose it
as a target because it can take on both a decreasing and a bell shape; it also generalizes
the gamma, generalized Pareto and the log-logistic distributions which would otherwise
be candidates in their own right (Burr, 1968; Burr and Cislak, 1968; Rodriguez, 1977;
Tadikamalla, 1980; Soliman, 2005).
The three parameter Burr XII distribution is defined by PDF
f(x) =
ξk(x/β)ξ−1
β((x/β)ξ + 1)k+1
and CDF
F (x) = 1− (1 + (x/β)ξ)−k
where ξ > 0 and k > 0 are shape parameters and β > 0 is the scale parameter. Because
of its flexibility and appropriate properties, we will consider the Burr XII distribution both
for CPU and memory marginals.
3.2.3 Modeling the Joint Distribution
Having modeled the stochastic behavior of one single attribute like CPU runtime or mem-
ory usage by an appropriate marginal distribution we now turn to handling the joint dis-
tribution of multiple attributes. At present, we focus on a joint distribution of CPU and
memory because this is what is in our data, although a generalization to further dimensions
is immediate.
As was discussed in Section 3.2.1, a copula is a highly convenient way to construct a
multivariate distribution that possesses a given set of marginal distributions exactly. Ac-
cordingly, we first model the marginals as described in the previous section. We then per-
form a probability integral transform to the data along each of these marginals. The proba-
bility integral transform converts a random variable A to a new random variable B, which
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] by applying the CDF of A, FA to itself: B = FA(A).
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Concretely, this means we apply each of our fitted marginal distributions Fi ∼ Burr XII
to the corresponding dimension of our data. This procedure produces a distribution on
the unit square with uniform margins but some more complex joint structure. We then
seek a parametric model for this joint-uniform distribution: i.e., a copula as defined in
Section 3.2.1.
By compositing our chosen copula with the marginal models, we then obtain a model
of the full joint distribution that has the appropriate marginal distributions exactly, and
where the joint dependence of the model is represented solely in the copula. This enable
us to both define and fit a complete joint distribution in a principled manner.
3.3 Methods
We fit our models to existing open data sets of Google resource loads (Google, 2011), and
evaluate the effectiveness of our models using standard bootstrap Goodness of Fit (GoF)
tests. In this section we explain the data set and the methods that are used to validate our
multivariate model.
3.3.1 The Data
Large open data sets for memory and CPU load are in fact hard to come by. The Google
cluster workload traces are one of the few publicly available traces from large cloud sys-
tems. The traces are compromised of 11, 000 machines’ logs from 29 days in May 2011.
These traces include over 650, 000 jobs. Each job consists at least one process, but of-
ten several. We perform our analysis at the process, not the job, level. For each process,
resource usage metrics including raw CPU usage, memory usage, page cache, etc., are
reported over five minute intervals. Although the resource sizes have been normalized by
dividing by the maximum value that appears anywhere in the trace, we have the informa-
tion required to perform our modeling.
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However, some pre-processing is required. A job or process can be terminated with
statuses including evicted, killed, failed, finished and lost. To prevent process duplication,
we focus solely on finished jobs, which are 54.7% of the total, resulting in a data set of
about 760, 000 processes. For each process, depending on its execution duration, there
will be one or more five-minute-interval records. Each such record has a starting time,
ending time, raw CPU usage (core-sec/sec), and maximum memory usage. Times are
in microseconds, and memory usage is scaled between 0 and 107. For each process, we
calculate the CPU runtime for each interval by multiplying the interval duration by the raw
CPU usage. We then calculate total process’ CPU runtime by adding these values over all
intervals in which the process executes. We interpret process’ memory as the maximum
memory usage over all process’ intervals.
3.3.2 Filtering and Smoothing
Before analyzing the data set and fitting it to our model, some further preparation is re-
quired. First, processes with blank or 0 reported usage are omitted, which is about 5% of
data. So our model is conditioned on resources being required in the first place. Further,
while the bulk of the data comes from a reasonable spread of job types, it includes a set
of extreme outliers associated with very large jobs that are different in kind to the balance
of the data. The raw empirical distribution is consequently multi-modal in the tail. We
believe this is a limitation of the data size (large though it is), and that if the number of job
types included in the data were larger, these modes in the tail would disappear. In order
to correct for this, we restrict ourselves to the bulk of the jobs outside of these extreme
outliers. Consequently, we restrict to CPU usage below 5 ∗ 106 and memory usage below
7.5 ∗ 104. The final data represents 82% of the raw data.
Next, to both cope with noise in the data and to interpolate between the job types
present in it, we turn to smoothing. There are many different ways to smooth data, we
choose to use simple kernel density smoothing. Kernel density estimation is a form of
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locally weighted averaging, controlled by a locally applied kernel operator. Specifically,
given a random sample X1, X2, . . . , Xn with a continuous density f , the kernel density
estimator is in the form of:
fˆ(x, h) =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
K
(
x−Xi
h
)
where K is the kernel density function, x is the point where the density is estimated, Xi
is the center of interval, and h is the bandwidth. The effectiveness of the smoothing is
highly dependent on the h parameter. With small h, more details are preserved, and as h
increases the curve becomes smoother. The kernel functionK is a symmetric function that
integrates to 1 over the full domain. We used a simple normal function for our kernel. We
used the bivariate form of this type of smoothing to simultaneously handle both CPU and
memory, and fit our marginal distributions based on this smoothed data. For 2 dimensional
data, the kernel density estimator is in below form:
fˆ((x, y), h) =
1
nh1h2
n∑
i=1
K
(
x−Xi
h1
,
y − Yi
h2
)
We use 2 dimensional kernel density estimator to smooth the data, and the value of h
for memory and CPU is 0.4 and 0.3 respectfully.
3.3.3 Bootstrapping Goodness-of-Fit Testing
Given an observed data set and a family of distributions that we hypothesize the data
to be drawn from, we would like to know whether our hypothesis is a plausible one, given
the data. A standard approach to answering this kind of question is to use a goodness-of-fit
test, which quantifies the plausibility of the hypothesis. In standard statistical hypothesis
testing, one calculates a test statistic p, that captures the probability of the data being at
least as “extreme” as that observed, given that the hypothesis is true. When this probability
is less than a specified significance level, α, we reject the hypothesis. In typical usage,
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Algorithm 1 The Bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the fit of a given hypothesized
family of distributions against an observed set of data.
Input: b, Observed Data O, Hypothesized Distribution H
Output: p-value
1: c← 0
2: n← Size of O
3: γO ← Estimate parameters of H on O by MLE
4: Ko ← DKS(O,H(γO))
5: for i = 1 . . . b do
6: Ri ← Generate s random points ∼ H(γo)
7: γi ← Estimate Parameters of H on Ri by MLE
8: Ki ← DKS(Ri, H(γi))
9: if Ki ≥ Ko then
10: c← c+ 1
11: end if
12: end for
13: p-value← c/n
14: return p-value
the hypothesis is a so called null (e.g. the data is explained by randomness), and so a
rejection of this hypothesis in favor of an alternative and mutually exclusive one held by
the researcher is the desired outcome, in that it provides evidence in favor of the alternative
hypothesis. Thus, concretely, for disproving a null hypothesis you want p < α. Here
though, in goodness-of-fit testing, we wish to find evidence that our hypothesis is true
(i.e., the data is consistent with our fitted distribution). Consequently, a small p-value (i.e.,
below α) is evidence against our proposed model, and we want p > α, ideally significantly
so (D’Agostino, 1986).
To perform such a test, it remains to choose the notion of “extreme” that defines p.
Many such test statistics have been proposed. In this work, we employ the commonly
used Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic:
DKS(O,F ) = supx{F (x)− FO(x)}
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where FO(x) is the empirical CDF of the observed data calculated as:
FO(x) =
1
n
n∑
i
I(Xi ≤ x)
where I is the indicator function which is 1 iff the given condition is true and 0 other-
wise. DKS measures the maximum point-wise difference in the CDF of the hypothesized
distribution and the observed data.
When the hypothesis is that the data is drawn from a concrete distribution, not a pa-
rameterized family, then a simple goodness-of-fit test is available: One finds the quantile
of
√
nDKS in the well-known Kolmogorov distribution, and this quantile is taken as the
value of p.
However, when testing the goodness-of-fit of a distribution fit from a parameterized
family of distributions, the Kolmogorov distribution is no longer the appropriate target
of comparison for DKS . If one is fitting a parameterized Normal model, then the Lil-
liefors test (Lilliefors, 1967) is appropriate, which works in the same way as the standard
approach but uses a carefully adjusted testing distribution rather than the Kolmogorov
distribution.
We wish to use the KS test in far more complex settings where no test distribution
has been identified. To do this, we employe a method known as parametric bootstrapping
(Clauset et al., 2009). In this method, a small p-value is still interpreted as a rejection of the
hypothesis, and a large p-value as greater evidence in favor of the hypothesis (i.e., more
similarity between the data and the hypothesized distribution). However, in parametric
bootstrapping, the p value is based not only on the test statistic (e.g., in our case DKS)
computed over the observed data and the fitted hypothesized distribution, but also over
synthetic data drawn from this fitted distribution and re-fits of the hypothesis model to
these synthetic data.
Specially, we first fit our model to the observed data by estimating the parameters using
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Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). MLE chooses the parameters which maximize
the likelihood of observing the data under the model. Then we calculate the test statistic
over the observed data and our fitted model. Next, we draw b synthetic data sets from the
fitted model using the parameters we have just estimated. For each, we run MLE again
to estimate the parameters of a new model from the hypothesized family of distributions,
and then calculate the test statistic between the synthetic sample and its specially estimated
private model. The p-value is then defined to be the fraction of the synthetic data whose
test value is larger than the test value obtained from observed data. Algorithm 1 shows the
steps of this parametric bootstrapping algorithm formally. The effect is a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test that is unbiased when used on hypotheses involving fitted families of
distributions. The larger the number of synthetic data sets generated, b, the more reliable
p-value obtained. In our analysis we let b = 1000.
Our data was processed in Matlab, and analyzed in R. We used the copula and CDVine
packages to perform our copula-based fits and as the basis for implementing Algorithm 1.
3.4 Results
Using this framework, we next fit models of CPU and memory usage both separately, and
subsequently together as a joint model of demand. Since, we restrict to CPU usage below
5 ∗ 106 and memory usage below 7.5 ∗ 104, all fitted distributions are truncated at these
points.
3.4.1 Fitting the Marginals
In both the CPU and memory usage data, there are generally sufficiently large numbers
of big jobs that we expected a heavy-tailed distributions to fit well. We fit our truncated
data using Burr XII, lognormal, generalized Pareto and log-logistic distributions by MLE.
Table 3.2 lists the parameters as computed.
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Distribution CPUParameters
p
value
Memory
Parameters
p
value
Burr XII
ξ = 178000
c = .9
κ = .15
.52
ξ = 15900
c = 1.8
κ = 1.05
.74
Generalized
Pareto
ξ = 839262
θ = 0
κ = .26
0
ξ = 23540
θ = 0
κ = −0.26
0
Lognormal µ = 13.05σ = 1.59 0
µ = 13.16
σ = .91 0
Loglogistic µ = 14.2σ = 1.8 0
µ = 9.56
σ = .5 0
Table 3.2: Maximum Likelihood Estimated distribution parameters for
CPU and Memory and their associated p-values calculated by parametric
bootstrapping.
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Figure 3·1: CDF of CPU usage for the empirical distribution, as well as
MLE fits of the Burr XII, Generalized Pareto, Lognormal and Loglogistic
distributions.
To evaluate the model fit, we begin by visually observing the correspondence between
the empirical CDF and the model CDF. Figure 3·1 illustrates this for CPU usage and
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Figure 3·2: CDF of memory usage for the empirical distribution, as well as
MLE fits of the Burr XII, Generalized Pareto, Lognormal and Loglogistic
distributions.
Figure 3·2 for memory usage. Each figure shows the empirical distribution of the data,
as well as the CDF specified by each of the parametric distributions with the parameters
specified in Table 3.2. We observe that the truncated Burr XII distribution is the best fit
(closest to the empirical distribution) for both CPU runtime and memory usage.
To back up the intuition we obtain from the graphs, we formally evaluate the goodness-
of-fit of each distribution using the bootstrap KS method from Section 3.3.3, evaluating
the CPU and memory data separately. In order to run the test over our smoothed data,
we need to resample it. Accordingly, we sample 5000 data points, and run our KS test
procedure using the distributions and parameters from Table 3.2 as our hypothesis. The
resulting p-value is also shown in Table 3.2, for both the CPU and memory models. From
the table it is clear that lognormal, log-logistic and Pareto distribution perform poorly, with
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the differences between their fitted distributions and the data being strongly statistically
significant. The calculated p-value of the Burr XII is very large, indicating no evidence to
distinguish it from the observed data for CPU and memory. We therefore adopt it as our
marginal model of both resources (with different parameters for each).
3.4.2 Fitting the Copula
Having created a model for each of the marginal distributions, we next turn to modeling
the copula needed to relate them. To get a sense of the joint data (and to use as a baseline
comparison for the fidelity of our eventual model) we show a scatter/histogram plot of a
sample of 2500 data points of the smoothed data with joint CPU and memory distribution
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Figure 3·3: A scatter/histogram plot of the observed CPU and memory
usage data. A histogram in each dimension is provided in the margins. We
show a 2500 point sample to improve visibility.
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Distribution EstimatedParameter p-value
Gaussian 0.329 0.08
Frank 1.993 0.26
Gumbel 1.226 0.03
T Copula 0.272 0.005
Clayton 0.329 0.17
Table 3.3: The copula parameters as fitted by MLE for each copula we
evaluated. This is Σ for the Gaussian, and the λ term in the generator
function for the Archimedean copulae. We also report the associated p-
value as calculated by our parametric bootstrap KS-test.
in Figure 3·3.
Next, in Figure 3·4 we illustrate the joint “coupiling” structure in the empirical data,
independent of the marginal distributions in. To produce this plot, we apply the probability
integral transform described in Section 3.2.3 to the data in Figure 3·3. Specifically, we use
the truncated Burr XII marginal distributions we found in Section 3.4.1 for both CPU and
memory usage.
We can see that our truncated Burr XII marginal distribution is doing an effective job
at capturing most of the marginal structure, and thus the probability integral transform
yields data on the unit cube that is nearly uniform in each dimension.
Having applied our marginal models, we next seek a parametric copula model that
captures the joint-uniform structure we observe in Figure 3·4. Accordingly, we fit five of
the most commonly used families of copula including Gaussian, Frank, Gumbel, T, and
Clayton. Table 3.3 shows the estimated parameters for each family from a 1000 data point
sample of the smoothed data.
To get a sense of the copulae produced, we plot a random sample from the fitted Frank
copula in a scatter/histogram in Figure 3·5 and the fitted Clayton copula in Figure 3·6.
Comparing these to the transformed observed data in Figure 3·4, one can see that both
copulae produce a reasonable match by visual inspection; we will subsequently show
KS tests that validate this observation. Plots for the other copulae we investigated were
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Figure 3·4: The probability integral transform applied to the the joint CPU
and memory usage data in figure 3·3, based on the truncated Burr XII
distribution fit according to the values provided in Table 3.2. This data
embodies the empirical copula when the margins have been described by
our choice of parametric distributions. Because they are parametric forms,
these marginals should generalize far better than the empirical CDFs used
in Figure 3·4. We show a 2500 point sample to improve visibility.
broadly similar, though they do not match as well as the Frank and Clayton do.
Across their full parameterizations, the Frank and Clayton copulae have quite different
structures. However, for the parameters chosen by the MLE fit, they produce quite similar
distributions, as shown in Figures 3·5 and 3·6. In both cases, the correlation is higher at
the low end, and is less pronounced for larger values, matching the empirical data seen
in Figure 3·4 This structure makes sense for our domain, as we expect a high correlation
in demand for CPU and memory among those processes that request small amounts of
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Figure 3·5: Here we show 2500 random points drawn from the Frank cop-
ula using the parameters provided in Table 3.3. We observe a high correla-
tion between small values and a modest correlation between large resource
requests, which matches well the observed data in Figure 3·4 .
resources, and a more modest correlation in demand among those processes requesting
considerable resources. Put another way, for typical data-center processes, small jobs
usually both request small amounts of memory and have short runtime, while large jobs
(in either CPU or Memory) can request either large or small amounts of the other resource.
The above not withstanding, the Frank copula is characterized by a modest an addi-
tional increase in correlation at the most extremely large values, although the overall level
of correlation in the tails is weak compared to other copula (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007).
This correlation structure does appear to be present in our data, and so at least visually the
Frank appears to be a just slightly better match than the Clayton for our data.
Next, to evaluate goodness-of-fit, we used our bootstrap KS test algorithm, but now
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Figure 3·6: Here we show 2500 random points drawn from the Clayton
copula using the parameters provided in Table 3.3. We observe a high
correlation among small resource requests and some correlation between
large resource requests, which matches the observed data in Figure 3·4.
on the bivariate copulae instead of univariate marginals. The resulting p-values are listed
in Table 3.3. From the table, one can see that p-value for all the copulae except Frank
and Clayton copula are small, indicating evidence to reject them. Although the Gaussian
model has a p-value large enough to be plausible, it is dwarfed by the much larger values
supported by the Frank and Clayton copulae. These large values indicate that we have
no evidence to reject them as reasonable models of the coupling between the CPU and
memory properties. We note that although the Frank copula has a slightly higher p-value,
we don’t find this difference significant enough to claim it is dominant over the Clayton.
Consequently, we believe both the Frank and the Clayton to be reasonable models under
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Figure 3·7: Lastly we draw 2500 points from our full end-to-end multi-
variate model, using the same Frank copula parametrized in Table 3.3 and
illustrated in Figure 3·5. One can see that the model closely matches the
original data shown in Figure 3·3.
suitable parameterizations.
The last step of validating our model is to evaluate the complete model including both
the marginals and the copula together. To do this we construct a full joint model using both
our Burr XII marginals (different parametrizations for CPU and memory) and Frank and
Clayton copula as we have fit its parameters. Figures 3·7 and 3·8 show scatter/histogram
of 2500 points generated randomly from these full joint distribution models. Comparing
them to a similar sample of raw data in Figure 3·3, we observe a strong resemblance.
We formalize this by using a two-sample KS test to compare the observed data and data
drawn from our fitted model. Table 3.4 shows the resulting p-value. The large p-values
shown for both the Frank and Clayton copula indicate that our aggregate Burr XII-copula
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Figure 3·8: 2500 points from our full end-to-end multivariate model, us-
ing the same Clayton copula parametrized in Table 3.3 and illustrated in
Figure 3·6.This model, also, closely matches the original data shown in
Figure 3·3.
model can not be statistically differentiated from the data, and thus form a valid model of
joint demand. Consequently, to the degree that the Google data is representative of other
data-centers, a suitable parametrization of our model is likely to be widely applicable.
Distribution End to EndP-value
Gaussian 0.15
Frank 0.44
Gumbel 0.08
T Copula 0.05
Clayton 0.41
Table 3.4: The resulting p-value, calculated by two-samples bootstrap KS-
test for comparing actual data and full joint distribution models created by
different copulae
Part II
Layered Service Pricing
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Chapter 4
Pricing Differentiated Internet Services in a
Layered Market
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Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers,
has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most
of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has
been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players
may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine
the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this chapter, we present
a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architec-
tures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries
between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that
they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the
services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level
compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly
market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price
constraints at the providers’ level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of
brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares. The
structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1 we introduce a novel two-layered
network market model in which providers and brokers offer differentiated services and
compete in a non-cooperative game at each layer. We model the price selection based
on Hotteling’s location model, and we characterize the competitive behavior of players at
each level of the service hierarchy based on a Bertrand game. We consider the market
at the Nash Equilibrium point, where all players are in their steady state and solve the
model using a two-stage procedure. Then, In Section 4.2 we analyze the actions of play-
ers under a monopoly setting. Our main results, obtained with an analytical analysis and
with numerical simulations, show that, when there are only two brokers, a higher quality
differentiation leads to higher provider’s profit. We proceed with Section 4.2.4, where it’s
found that, when there are multiple brokers, the cost of converting the quality becomes an
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important factor for profit maximization.
4.1 Model and Solution
In this section, we present our model and analysis of a two-level game configuration and
focus on the competition among providers and brokers and what emerges as pricing of
their services. Figure 4·1 illustrates the game-theoretic model: At the lower level, we have
two service providers, while at the higher level, we have m ≥ 2 service sellers or brokers
that deal directly with users. Note that owning a network infrastructure is expensive,
and only a few large companies can afford its cost. There are however many brokerage
companies. Our model’s goal is limited to analyzing and understanding the dynamics of
a market in a formal economic setting. To this aim, we start by considering only two
network / lower-level providers in a simple oligopoly market competition. The exclusion
of more complex relationships that may exist in real markets keeps our model tractable
while still producing interesting results and insights.
To model service quality differentiation, we adopt Hotteling’s location model
(Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont et al., 1979) which introduced the idea of modeling differ-
ence between products as differences in a product’s location in a product space. The idea is
widely used for both location problems (ReVelle, 1986; ReVelle and Eiselt, 2005; Me´riaux
et al., 2011) and quality differentiation (Farahani et al., 2014; Economides and Lehr, 1994;
Nagurney and Li, 2014) in network studies. In Hotteling’s model (Hotelling, 1929), there
are two firms selling identical goods along a street. Customers are assumed to be uni-
formly distributed in the space, and the transport cost is a linear function of their distance
to the selected firm. A consumer selects the firm that minimizes her cost of transportation
to buy the product. Hotteling concluded that two firms would locate close to each other
near the center. Later, D’Aspremont et al. (d’Aspremont et al., 1979) changed the util-
ity function from linear to quadratic form, where firms choose to maximize their distance
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Figure 4·1: Game-theoretic Model of a Two-level Competition among
Brokers and Service Providers. At each level, brokers and service providers
are in a Bertrand competition with each other. The set of strategies are the
service prices and each player tries to maximize her revenue.
to the opposite player, and there is equilibrium for price competition. Brenner (Brenner,
2005) extended the game with the quadratic cost function to more than two firms. He has
shown that for more than two firms, the “principle of maximum differentiation” does not
hold, and corner firms would benefit from moving marginally toward the market center.
In our work, we model service quality differentiation after Hotteling’s product differen-
tiation, where customers have different preference for service quality that is modeled by
their willingness to pay for that quality.
We start by presenting our notation and some basic settings, then we discuss some
analytical and numerical results.
4.1.1 Model Description
Let us consider a system with a continuum of customers, m service sellers (brokers),
denoted by Bi, i = 1, . . . ,m, and two service providers, Sj, j = 1, 2. We assume that
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customers have different preference for quality (utility) described by:
θq − p
where θ is the customer’s marginal willingness to pay for quality q, and p is the price of
service. There is a distribution of θ among customers. For simplicity, we assume that θ is
uniformly distributed on an interval θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] and θmax > 2 θmin. Customers seek
a broker that maximizes their utility.
Both brokers and service providers can offer services with different qualities, but we
assume that each player only offers one class of quality (Gibbens et al., 2000). The ser-
vice quality offered by brokers is denoted by qi and lies in an interval q ∈ [qmin, qmax].
The quality offered by service providers is denoted by Qj . Also, we assume that bro-
kers and service providers compete in an imperfectly competitive market. Furthermore,
we assume that there is no supply constraint and so there are enough resources to meet
each demand. We also assume that there is no geographical or performance limitation
on service providers and that brokers can get all their required services from the service
provider that is more economically convenient. As we mentioned earlier, in our model,
service providers have already incurred the cost of setting up their infrastructure, so they
intend to attract part of the market and stay in the market. So without loss of generality,
we assume that S1 attempts to keep at least the broker with the lowest quality (B1) as
her buyer, and S2 attempts to keep the broker with the highest quality (Bm) as her buyer
(unless as we note in Section 4.1.6, the market does not support this assumption) while
other brokers choose the service provider that offers the lower cost.
We assume that providers, and brokers, compete separately with each other in a
Bertrand game. In this market structure, the players compete with each other non-
cooperatively to achieve their objectives (i.e., maximize profit) by controlling the price
of the their services. The decision of each player is influenced by other players’ actions
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and the action of a player may be observed by all other players. The players are service
providers at the lower level and brokers at the higher level. The strategy of each player
is the non- negative service price. The payoff (utility function) is the profit generated by
selling the services. This game has a Nash equilibrium. 1 We solve the model using a
two-stage procedure. First, given the service providers’ price, ri’s, and demand as a func-
tion of the brokers’ price, the brokers compete in a Bertrand game. The Nash equilibrium
of the Bertrand game leads to an optimal price for the brokers and therefore the demand
becomes a function of the qualities and the service providers’ price ri’s. In the second
stage, service providers compete in a Bertrand game to maximize their profit by setting
their price. Substituting ri’s into the demand obtained by the Nash equilibrium at the pre-
vious stage, we can determine the final optimal price for the service providers and brokers.
We describe the game in detail next.
4.1.2 Demand Distribution
Brokers first choose the quality of service that they will provide to customers, then they
compete on prices. If the brokers choose the same quality, then the customers decide only
based on the price, and this leads to a Bertrand competition with identical goods, whose
prices should be set equal to costs, and no one makes profit. Thus the brokers should
choose to offer different service qualities to make profits. Without loss of generality, we
assume that qm > ... > q2 > q1, and also Q2 > Q1. Therefore, customers with a high
willingness to pay for quality will buy from Bm, while customers with a low willingness
will buy from B1.
For simplicity, first let us assume that we have two brokers, B1 and B2. We can
characterize the demand for each broker by identifying the customers who are indifferent
between the two differentiated qualities. The indifferent customers, represented by θ∗,
1By definition, the Nash equilibrium of a game is a strategy profile (list of strategies, one for each player)
with the property that no player can increase her payoff by choosing a different action, given other players’
actions (Osborne, 2004).
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satisfy:
θ∗q1 − p1 = θ∗q2 − p2 ⇔ θ∗ = p2 − p1
q2 − q1 (4.1)
Having uniformly distributed θ, the demand for each broker, B1 and B2, is given by:
D1(p1, p2) =
θ∗ − θmin
∆θ
=
1
∆θ
(
p2 − p1
q2 − q1 − θmin)
D2(p1, p2) =
θmax − θ∗
∆θ
=
1
∆θ
(θmax − p2 − p1
q2 − q1 )
(4.2)
where ∆θ ≡ θmax − θmin.
For more than two brokers, we can generalize Equation (4.1) to find indifferent cus-
tomers θ∗i between any two brokers Bi and Bi+1:
θ∗i qi − pi = θ∗i qi+1 − pi+1 ⇔ θ∗i =
pi+1 − pi
qi+1 − qi (4.3)
Consequently, the demand for each broker is given by:
D1(p1, p2, . . . , pm) =
θ∗1 − θmin
∆θ
Di(p1, p2, . . . , pm) =
θ∗i − θ∗i−1
∆θ
1 < i < m
Dm(p1, p2, . . . , pm) =
θmax − θ∗m−1
∆θ
(4.4)
Note that in the above equations Di’s assume values in the interval [0, 1]. This means that
if for broker Bi the demand Di is negative, then Bi is “out of the market”; more precisely,
we can rewrite the demand function as:
Di = min
{
max
{
0,
θ∗i − θ∗i−1
∆θ
}
, 1
}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m (4.5)
4.1.3 Brokers’ Profits
Now that we have the demand distribution, we can calculate broker i’s profit, assuming
that convertingQj to qi (whether to upgrade or downgrade the service) has a marginal cost
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ci:
Πi = piDi − qiDi
Qj
rj − ciDi(Qj − qi)2 (4.6)
where rj is the price of service that broker Bi pays to service provider Sj , and qiDiQj is
the amount of service that Bi needs to buy to supply its own market. This is because, if
we consider that the quality of the service is given by the quantity of needed resources,
such as bandwidth or memory, then the required resources that a broker needs to buy can
be obtained from qi
Qj
Di. For example, consider a broker’s QoS requirement of 10Mbps
(qi), and a service provider offering 5Mbps (Qj) channels; this would result in ( qiQj ) =
10
5
= 2 demand requests from the broker to the service provider to combine two provider’s
channels and upgrade the lower-level service. On the other hand, if qi= 5Mbps and Qj=
10Mbps, then this results in 0.5 demand request and possibly lower cost for the broker. We
also assume that the cost to the broker, ci, to convert the service quality that such a broker
gets from the service provider, is proportional to the square of the difference in quality,
(Qj − qi). Intuitively, the cost increases more rapidly as the service quality increases,
or alternatively, there is a diminishing return in service quality as more resources are
allocated and cost increases. For simplicity, we assume that ci = c.
Since we assume that each broker buys just from one lower-level provider that yields
less cost for the broker, the following result holds:
Theorem 4.1. Let us consider a market with two service providers and multiple brokers.
Let us assume that the two providers offer their services in the same geographical area. To
guarantee an oligopoly market at the service provider level (which captures the attempt of
service providers to stay in the market), the broker with lowest quality buys from the lower
quality provider and the highest quality broker buys from the higher quality provider.
Proof. We need to show that if the broker with the lowest quality B1 prefers to buy from
the higher quality provider S2, then the other brokers also prefer to buy from S2; therefore
no broker will buy from the lower quality provider S1, that is, we have a monopoly market
at the provider level.
Let us assume that B1 prefers to buy from S2, then the cost of buying from S1 must be
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greater than the cost of buying from S2:
q1
Q1
r1 + c(q1 −Q1)2 > q1
Q2
r2 + c(q1 −Q2)2
After expanding the quadratic terms and simplifying, we have:
q1(
r1
Q1
− 2cQ1) + cQ21 > q1(
r2
Q2
− 2cQ2) + cQ22
Grouping the terms that have q1 as a factor, we have:
q1(
r1
Q1
− 2cQ1 − r2
Q2
+ 2cQ2) > c(Q
2
2 −Q21)
Giving that the quality of other brokers is higher than B1 (qi > q1), the derived inequality
holds for other brokers as well. Even for other brokers, buying from S1 is more costly,
therefore we have a monopoly market (no broker buys from S1). The same logic applies
if Bm prefers to buy from S1. Hence we prove the claim.
Now that we have the profit function for brokers, we can find the optimal price for
them. In the first stage, given the service prices rj , and service qualities Qj , the brokers
compete in a Bertrand game with differentiated goods. We present the results for the case
m = 2, but all results can be similarly calculated for general cases with more than two
brokers. As we have seen, in a Bertrand game, players control the price to maximize their
profit. The solution to the Bertrand game is hence a Nash Equilibrium, which is obtained
as follows: We substitute Equation (4.2) into Equation (4.6), and solve ∂Πi/∂pi = 0 to
obtain Nash equilibrium, that leads to:
p1 =
1
3
((q2 − q1) (θmax − 2θmin) + 2q1r1
Q1
+
q2r2
Q2
+ 2c (q1 −Q1) 2 + c (q2 −Q2) 2) (4.7)
p2 =
1
3
((q2 − q1) (2θmax − θmin) + q1r1
Q1
+
2q2r2
Q2
+ c (q1 −Q1) 2 + 2c (q2 −Q2) 2) (4.8)
Now the brokers’ prices, p1 and p2, are a function of the brokers’ and providers’ service
qualities, and providers’ prices rj’s. The next step is to plug them into Di’s to obtain the
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demand as a function of rj’s :
D1 =
1
3∆θ
(θmax − 2θmin) +
q2r2
Q2
− q1r1
Q1
− c (q1 −Q1) 2 + c (q2 −Q2) 2
3∆θ (q2 − q1) (4.9)
D2 =
1
3∆θ
(2θmax − θmin) +
q1r1
Q1
− q2r2
Q2
+ c (q1 −Q1) 2 − c (q2 −Q2) 2
3∆θ (q2 − q1) (4.10)
Now, D1 and D2 are dependent on service providers’ prices rj’s, which shows the
interaction between the two layers. Providers’ prices affect the cost for brokers and in turn
affect the price of brokers and consequently the demands of both brokers and providers.
In the next subsection we show how to find the optimal rj’s.
4.1.4 Providers’ Profits
At this stage, we have the total demand served by (service sold by) each broker. To have
an imperfectly competitive market at the level of service providers, the combination of
their price and quality should be such that each broker prefers a different service provider.
Assuming B1 prefers S1 and B2 prefers S2, the following inequalities should hold for B1
and B2, respectively:
q1
Q1
r1 + c(q1 −Q1)2 < q1
Q2
r2 + c(q1 −Q2)2
q2
Q2
r2 + c(q2 −Q2)2 < q2
Q1
r1 + c(q2 −Q1)2
(4.11)
These constraints ensure that broker B1 chooses provider S1 and B2 chooses S1, as the
cost is lower than that of getting service from the other provider. Later we will discuss the
situation when one of these constraints is violated.
For the general case, we assume that the first k brokers choose provider S1 and the
remaining brokers Bk+1 to Bm choose S2. Constraints (4.11) should hold for Bk and
Bk+1 instead of B1 and B2.
In this stage of the game, service providers compete in another Bertrand game. The
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profit of each provider is defined as:
U1 =
k∑
i=1
Diqi
Q1
(r1 − f1)− eQ21
U2 =
n∑
i=k+1
Diqi
Q2
(r2 − f2)− eQ22
(4.12)
where eQ2j is the cost of providing qualityQj , rj is the service price and fj represents some
general cost (fee). After plugging Equations (4.9) and (4.10) into the providers’ profit, we
obtain quadratic equations in rj . To obtain the optimal solution (Nash equilibrium), we
solve ∂Uj/∂rj = 0 which, for two providers, yields:
r1 =
2f1
3
+
f2q2Q1
3q1Q2
+
Q1
3q1
× [c(q2 −Q2)2 − c(q1 −Q1)2 − (q1 − q2)(4θmax − 5θmin)]
r2 =
2f2
3
+
f1q1Q2
3q2Q1
+
Q2
3q2
× [c(q1 −Q1)2 − c(q2 −Q2)2 − (q1 − q2)(5θmax − 4θmin)]
By substituting rj’s in Equations (4.7) and (4.8), we get the final values for pi’s as functions
of only user preferences and service qualities (besides marginal costs/fees):
p1 =
1
9
(
5c(q1 −Q1)2 + 4c(q2 −Q2)2
)
+
4f2q2Q1 + 5f1q1Q2
9Q1Q2
+
1
9
(q2−q1)(16θmax−20θmin)
p2 =
1
9
(
4c(q1 −Q1)2 + 5c(q2 −Q2)2
)
+
5f2q2Q1 + 4f1q1Q2
9Q1Q2
+
1
9
(q2−q1)(20θmax−16θmin)
We obtain the final values for Di’s from Equations (4.9) and (4.10):
D1 =
1
9∆θ
(4θmax − 5θmin) + c(q1 −Q1)
2 − c(q2 −Q2)2
9∆θ(q1 − q2) +
−f2q2Q1 +Q2f1q1
9∆θ(q1 − q2)Q1Q2
D2 =
1
9∆θ
(5θmax − 4θmin) + c(q2 −Q2)
2 − c(q1 −Q1)2
9∆θ(q1 − q2) +
f2q2Q1 −Q2f1q1
9∆θ(q1 − q2)Q1Q2
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4.1.5 Positive Utility
In the previous setting we assumed that customers buy service from either B1 or B2, even
if their utility is negative. Here we solve a game with only positive utility customers, i.e.,
customers whose value of θq−p is positive. Therefore, customers with zero utility provide
a lower bound on θ (we call it θ0), which can be found by solving θ0q1 − p1 = 0. Thus
θmin is replaced by p1q1 :
D1(p1, . . . , pm) =
θ∗1 − θ0
∆θ
=
1
∆θ
(
p2 − p1
q2 − q1 −
p1
q1
) (4.13)
As in our previous setting, this is a two-stage Bertrand game, and the Nash equilib-
rium for each game is found by replacing the Di’s into the profit functions and solving
∂Πi/∂pi = 0 and ∂Ui/∂ri = 0. We discuss the difference between this positive utility
game and the previous (unconstrained utility) game later in Section 4.2.
4.1.6 Game with Constraints
At the lower level of service providers, the constraints (4.11) are not considered while
calculating the equilibrium points. Therefore, in some situations, one of the constraints
might be violated. Let us assume that after finding ri’s, the constraint for B1 is violated,
i.e., q1
Q1
r1 + c(q1 − Q1)2 ≥ q1Q2 r2 + c(q1 − Q2)2. This means that, under this condition,
brokerB1 incurs more cost to buy service from provider S1 than provider S2; so if provider
S1 does not change its price, B1 will get service from S2, and this situation leads to a
monopoly market at the providers’ level.
To find an optimal point that also meets the constraints (4.11), provider S1 should set
its price such that
r1 <
Q1
q1
(
q1
Q2
r2 + c(q1 −Q2)2 − c(q1 −Q1)2)
In response, provider S2 updates its price by plugging r1 into ∂U2/∂r2 = 0 which leads to
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r2 = F(r1), i.e., r2 as a function of r1. Thus, S1 can replace r2 with F(r1) in its inequality
to calculate an optimal price that satisfies the constraint:
r1 =
Q1
q1
(
q1
Q2
F(r1) + c(q1 −Q2)2 − c(q1 −Q1)2
)
− ,  > 0
In this stage of the game, S1 should find a positive value for  that maximizes its profit. By
substituting r1 and r2 as functions of , U1 is a decreasing quadratic function of . Solving
∂U1/∂ = 0 results in optimal . If  < 0, it can be replaced with a small positive number
close to zero. Since U1 is decreasing with respect to , any other positive value larger than
the chosen  leads to less profit. Clearly, the new set of prices for the service providers
is an equilibrium point for the game, since it maximizes the revenue of both providers
while meeting the constraints, so each service provider does not lose its market (i.e., one
of the two brokers stays as its customer); therefore neither of the service providers has an
incentive to change its price independently.
4.2 Numerical Analysis
In this section we present some numerical results to illustrate the effect of choosing differ-
ent qualities of service by brokers. We consider settings with two, three and four brokers.
We also study the positive game model for two brokers. We show in detail how the best
strategy for any broker is to choose a quality level that maximizes quality differentiation
with other brokers. Also, when there are more brokers, the higher competition leads to
more reasonable prices and a lower probability of a monopoly market. In the following
subsections, we start with our main observations followed by a detailed analysis of our
results.
4.2.1 Two Brokers
Observation 4.1. All the players (brokers and providers) make more profit as the gap
between qualities of service offered by brokers increases, i.e., the maximum differentiation
56
30 40 50 600
0.5
1
Demand of Brokers (D)
D
em
an
d
 
 
30 40 50 600
10
20
Profit of Brokers (pi)
Quality of Service Offered by Broker B2 (q2)
Pr
of
it
30 40 50 600
50
100
150
Price of Service Providers (r)
Pr
ic
e
 
 
30 40 50 600
100
200
Price of Brokers (P)
Pr
ic
e
 
 
B1
B2
S1
S2
q1 = 13
Figure 4·2: Price, profit and demand distribution for brokers, and price of
providers, B1 downgrading the quality, Q1 = 20, q1 = 13, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤
q2 ≤ 60, as the service quality offered by broker B2 changes.
principle applies.
Observation 4.2. When the qualities of service offered by brokers are close to each other,
the demand mostly goes to the lower quality/price service. In this situation, it is more
likely that monopoly happens at the service provider level.
For the two brokers case, we consider a setting where θmax = 1.5, θmin = 0.2, c = 0.1,
and fi = .01265 × Q1.5i . The service qualities of the providers are set to Q1 = 20 and
Q2 = 45. For the brokers, q2 varies between 30 and 60, and we set q1 to different values
such that it is less than, equal to, or larger than Q1 to see how the market changes under
different conditions, although here we show plots for only two different values of q1.
Figure 4·2 shows the results when B1 downgrades the quality of service obtained from
S1 (q1 = 13), whereas Figure 4·3 shows the results when B1 upgrades that quality (q1 =
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Figure 4·3: Price, profit and demand distribution for brokers, and price of
providers, B1 upgrading the quality, Q1 = 20, q1 = 29, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤
q2 ≤ 60, as the service quality offered by broker B2 changes.
29). First, we note that the total demand constitutes the whole market. So, when the
demand for one broker/provider side decreases, the demand for the other side increases,
and vice versa. But this is not the case for prices and profits – they increase or decrease
together.
When brokerB1 downgrades the lower-level service obtained from its provider S1 (i.e.,
q1 < Q1), we see from the brokers’ and providers’ price plots (Figure 4·2) that all brokers
and providers can offer their service at higher prices and make more profit compared
to the case when B1 upgrades the obtained service from S1 (Figure 4·3). Similarly, by
comparing the behavior for higher values of q2, where q2 > Q2, with that for lower values
where q2 < Q2, we observe that a better strategy for broker B2 is to upgrade the lower-
level service that it obtains from S2 (i.e., q2 > Q2). This happens because upgrading q2 or
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downgrading q1 leads to a larger gap between q1 and q2, therefore the two sets of broker
and provider can offer more differentiated services at higher prices. In fact, this follows
the maximum differentiation principle.
In this setting, since we have the least number of brokers to compete, it is more likely
that monopoly situations happen. For example, for q1 = 29 (Figure 4·3), the market ex-
hibits abnormal behavior when the gap between q1 and q2 is small, while the gap between
providers’ qualities and brokers’ qualities is large. Specifically, the market approaches a
monopoly where B2 has a small market share when q2 is closer to the service quality of S1
(Q1). Observing the results when the values of q2 are close to 30, we note that, although
the providers’ game is a monopoly at some points (where S2’s price r2 = 0), the brokers’
game is not, and B2 can have a small share of the market D2 while it gets service from
provider S1. This is because when the gap between q1 and q2 is not significant, most of
the customers prefer the cheaper service provided by broker B1. When the market is a
monopoly, the provider or broker who remains in the market can increase its price while
ensuring that the other competitor cannot enter the market even if that competitor lowers
its price to equal its cost, thus there is no way for the competitor to make profit and is
prevented from entering the market.
On the other hand, for q1 = 29, when broker B2 is upgrading the service quality
obtained from S2, i.e., q2 > Q2, as the gap between q2 and Q2 gets larger, S2 starts to
decrease its price to cover the cost of the quality upgrade forB2 so as not to lose its market
share. Since the value of q1 is somewhere between Q1 and Q2, it is more economical for
B1 to buy service from S2 rather than S1 at the optimal prices, i.e., the optimal price of S1
violates constraints (4.11) and it should update its price r1 as we explained in Section 4.1.6.
Consequently, S2 should also update its price. Since there is a substantial gap between q1
and q2, both providers can compete in the market.
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Figure 4·4: Price, profit and demand distribution for brokers, and price of
providers, for the positive utility game, B1 downgrading the quality Q1 =
20, q1 = 13, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤ q2 ≤ 60, as the service quality offered by
broker B2 changes.
4.2.2 Positive Utility Results
Observation 4.3. In the positive utility game, increase in the profit of one player is at the
expense of the other player.
We now consider the case of positive utility competition. Intuitively, we expect to
see some restriction on the prices for all brokers and providers, otherwise they lose part
of the market for which the utility (θq − p) is negative. Therefore it is a compromise
between price and demand. The numerical results confirm this intuition. Comparing the
prices of brokers and providers under positive utility and unconstrained utility, for the
same conditions, shows that the highest prices under positive utility are below half of the
prices in the latter case, while the demands are less as well; compare plots in Figures 4·2
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Figure 4·5: Price, profit and demand distribution for brokers, and price
of providers, for the positive utility game, B1 upgrading the quality Q1 =
20, q1 = 13, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤ q2 ≤ 60, as the service quality offered by
broker B2 changes.
and 4·3 with plots in Figures 4·4 and 4·5.
Also in this positive utility game, whether brokers upgrade or downgrade the service
obtained from their providers, the behavior is different from that in the unconstrained
utility game. Specifically, since the positive utility market is more sensitive to prices, a
smaller gap between the service quality offered by the broker and the quality it gets from
its provider yields more profit. Furthermore, while for both brokers, slightly upgrading the
service obtained from lower-level providers (and in turn, selling a higher quality service to
customers) is generally more profitable (compare profit plots in Figure 4·4 and Figure 4·5),
B2 gains more profit from a larger quality gap caused by lower q1.
Unlike the unconstrained utility game, if profit increases for one player, profit de-
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creases for the other player. Another interesting observation from these plots is when the
market is a monopoly: while there are conditions under which broker B1 can lose its mar-
ket share (D1 = 0 when q2 = 30 in Figure 4·4), service provider S1 can manage to stay in
the market under all conditions.
4.2.3 Sensitivity to Quality-Conversion Cost
In our model, we assume that brokers can change the quality of service that they buy from
the service providers so they offer a new service that meets the requirements of customers.
Modeling the real cost function for converting the service quality is complicated and our
economic model clearly does not capture the complex structure of the market. For the sake
of analytical tractability, we have chosen a quadratic function c(qi −Qi)2, that intuitively
captures the reasonable assumption that the cost of service quality upgrade/downgrade by
a broker increases more rapidly as (the difference in) service quality increases.2 To study
the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we have analyzed the effect of this quality
conversion cost by examining different values for c. For relatively small values of c, bro-
kers are able to change the quality of the obtained (lower-level) services as much as they
want to achieve more service differentiation from other brokers. As the value of c gets
larger, the cost of converting the lower-level quality increases, and consequently there is
an optimal point for changing that quality as a broker maximizes service quality differen-
tiation from other brokers. Specifically, while for a broker, picking a quality beyond that
(optimal) point decreases the profit of that broker – because of the high cost of converting
the lower-level quality that it is getting – the profit of the other broker(s) still increases be-
cause of maximum service quality differentiation. In our numerical analysis, we assume
that the service qualities which B1 and Bm pick, are not beyond the optimal quality (that
2 Consider, for example, the service offered by a Content Distribution Network (CDN) provider who
manages the degree of replicating content to meet a certain delivery delay requirement. In this case, the cost
could be modeled as a function of the area over which the content is replicated, i.e., the cost is proportional
to the square of the radius/distance, where a larger distance reflects higher content replication and thus lower
delivery delay (higher/better quality of service).
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maximizes their profit).
4.2.4 Results with Three and Four Brokers
Observation 4.4. When there are more competitors in the market, the gap between their
service qualities decreases, the competition on the price becomes tougher and brokers
should offer their services at lower prices to be able to attract customers and make profit.
Observation 4.5. In the market with more than two brokers, though the maximum differ-
entiation between the service qualities of brokers reduces the intensity of competition, the
cost that brokers undergo is also playing an important role. There are situations where
violating the maximum differentiation rule in order to buy service from the other provider
gives rise to higher broker’s profit.
In this section we extend our setting to three and four brokers to see if the maximum
differentiation principle holds for more brokers. We assume that two brokers offering the
lowest and the highest quality of service to users are already in the market and define
the range of feasible quality. We then let the other one or two brokers enter the market
with a quality level chosen in such range. After fixing a quality level, the third (and
fourth) broker obtains service from the (lower-level) provider that minimizes the quality
difference between them. This in turn minimizes the broker’s cost in providing service
to its customers. As in previous case studies with only two brokers, we show results at
the equilibrium of the game by identifying indifferent customers between available service
qualities. We also apply all constraints on the providers’ level to have an oligopoly market.
Three Brokers
We consider the game with θmin = 1, θmax = 70, two providers S1 and S2 with Q1 = 30
and Q2 = 60, and three brokers, B1, B2 and B3, with qualities q1, q2 and q3, respectively.
We assume that the quality levels ofB1 andB3 are fixed and we let the quality of brokerB2
change in the interval (q1, q3). Broker B2 chooses the service provider with least quality
difference to reduce its (service conversion) cost. Given the above settings, we observe
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Figure 4·6: Profit of each broker in a three-broker case for varying q2.
a tipping point for the quality of broker B2 (q2): for q2 < 45, B2 chooses provider S1,
and for q2 > 45, B2 chooses provider S2; for the frontier value of q2 = 45, although
there is no quality differentiation between the two (lower-level) providers, we observe that
downgrading the service has less cost than upgrading it, therefore B2 chooses to get its
service from S2. The jump in profit at q2 = 45 in Figure 4·6 is because of B2’s switching
provider.
As we can see in Figure 4·6, for each of brokersB1 andB3, which have been already in
the market, it is more profitable if broker B2 chooses to offer a quality with the maximum
difference from their quality, while for broker B2 it is more profitable to have maximum
difference with both B1 and B3. As we have observed in the case of two brokers, it is
not advisable to choose a quality of service similar to that of other providers. Intuitively,
this is because the more difference in the service quality that they offer customers, brokers
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Figure 4·7: Demand of each broker in a three-broker case for varying q2.
are more likely to serve customers at a higher price. We note this by observing that the
optimal quality for broker B2 is the average of the other fixed brokers’ qualities (q1 and
q3). For example, in the first plot from left in Figure 4·6, the optimal q2 = 50, which is
obtained from (q1 + q3)/2 = (10 + 90)/2.
We also change the fixed service qualities of brokers B1 and B3 toward the optimal
quality for B2 to see how the market changes and compare such results with those of
Hotelling’s location model with more than two firms (Brenner, 2005). As we can see
in Figure 4·6, unlike the Hotelling’s model (Brenner, 2005) where corner firms have a
tendency to move toward internal firms, here all brokers make less profit when quality
differentiation decreases. Although, for brokerB3, its market share increases (Figure 4·7),
the effect of dropping the price is more pronounced than the extra share of the market and
leads to lower profit. Therefore, unlike the Hotelling’s location model, for three firms, the
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market follows the maximum differentiation principle and brokers make more profit when
their service qualities are more different from each other. In the following setting we
study four brokers to see if this pattern repeats.
Four Brokers
In this setting, we consider a scenario with two brokers, B1 and B4 already in the market
and offering fixed service qualities q1 = 10 and q4 = 90, respectively, and two other
brokers, B2 and B3, that enter the market later. Without loss of generality, we assume that
q2 < q3. Figure 4·8 shows the changes in profit for brokersB2 andB3. We omit the results
for B1 and B4 since they follow the same pattern as in the previous case study with three
brokers, i.e., the more differentiation between their qualities and those we set for B2 and
B3, the higher is their profit. This means that such brokers are not the decision makers in
this situation.
As we observe in Figure 4·8, for broker B3, whose quality is between q2 and q4, the
optimal quality q3 value is one that yields maximum differentiation from both qualities q2
and q4, which is close to the average of q2 and q4. For broker B2 we expect instead that
the optimal quality level is around q2 = 37, that is, the quality with maximum difference
from q1 (10) and the optimal q3 (which equals 64 given maximum quality differentiation
among all brokers). However, we observe that the optimal quality for B2 is at q2 = 45,
when broker B2 switches from provider S1 to provider S2 and instead of upgrading the
quality, downgrades the service that it obtains from provider S2 (recall that Q1 = 30 and
Q2 = 60). To understand why B2 violates the maximum differentiation rule, we analyze
the situations under both q2 = 37 and q2 = 45.
For q2 = 37, the observed optimal value for B3 is q3 = 56, and not the expected value
of q3 = 64. To explain this situation, we should consider that in making profit, besides
quality differentiation with other competitors (brokers), the cost of buying the lower-level
service is also important. In this case, broker B3 makes more profit if it chooses q3 =
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Figure 4·8: Profit of brokers B2 and B3 in a four-broker setting.
56 and downgrades the service it obtains from S2 (recall Q2 = 60) instead of choosing
q3 = 64 and upgrading the service. Broker B3 can then offer a quality-price combination
that attracts more customers, while because of the sufficient gap between q2 and q3, the
competition on the price is not tough. However, in this situation, broker B2 is upgrading
the service that it obtains from provider S1 (recall Q1 = 30) and to compete with broker
B3, it cannot offer a high price, and the profit that it makes is relatively low.
On the other hand, for q2 = 45, the situation is reversed. B2 downgrades the service
that it obtains from provider S2, while B3 at its optimal point is upgrading the service.
So the combination of quality-price of broker B2 attracts more customers which leads to
making more profit. Therefore in this game, besides maximum quality differentiation, the
cost that brokers undergo is also playing an important role and sometimes brokers should
compromise on maximum differentiation to reduce their cost and make more profit.
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Figure 4·9: Price of each broker in a four-broker setting.
Assuming rational players, i.e., the two new brokers pick the quality that maximizes
their profit, we compare the price of the service that such brokers offer for the case studies
of three and four brokers. In the case of three brokers, we observe that the optimal quality
for broker B2 is at q2 = 50 while q1 = 10 and q3 = 90. The optimal price for brokers
in this setting is p1 = 2092, p2 = 3203 and p3 = 5447, respectively. When four brokers
are playing the game, the optimal quality for broker B2 is q2 = 45 and for broker B3 is
q3 = 66. In this situation, the optimal prices are p1 = 1746, p2 = 2535, p3 = 3442 and
p4 = 4869. As we can see, the price of service with quality 10 and 90 drops from 2092
and 5447 to 1746 and 4869, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Impact of Cooperation among a Subset of
Brokers on Service Pricing
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In Chapter 4, we studied the pricing strategy in a two-layered network market, where
service providers and brokers compete at different levels in an oligopoly market to maxi-
mize their profit. We modeled a non-cooperative game, in which all players try to optimize
their own profit independently. The non-cooperative nature of players might have oppo-
site impact on the profit of players and leads them to less profit. Cooperative game, as one
of the important branches of game theory, has proposed solutions for these situations. In
cooperative games, a subset of players make agreement about joint strategies and how the
total payoff is to be divided among them. Therefore, players in the coalition maximize
the total profit instead of focusing on their own profit. The goal in cooperation game is
to design a profit sharing strategy that is fair and also incentivize the players to cooperate.
There are a wide range of works related to cooperation game that are covered in section
2.2.1.
In our setting, there are two service providers with different qualities at the lower level
and two or more brokers on top of them. When a new broker enters the market, it chooses
the quality that maximize its profit; however, it happens that the quality chosen by the new
broker is not the best for brokers that are already in the market. In this work, we study
the oligopoly market at the brokers level, with two or more players, where a new broker
enters the market and cooperates with one of the existing players in the market instead
of competing. In this chapter, we study the impact of this cooperation on the quality that
new player chooses, the price of players in the market, and also customers’ social welfare.
While in the most situation, cooperation helps players to make more profit, and has a
negative impact on customers’ utility, there are cases that coalition players and customers
benefits from the cooperation.
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5.1 Profit Sharing Policy
In this part we study a market with two service providers and two or more brokers, denoted
by Si’s andBi’s, respectively, where a new broker enters the market. Service providers and
brokers compete in two different levels in a Bertrand competition to find their best strategy.
We consider the market under different situations where the new broker cooperates with
one of the other brokers. We assume that the new broker picks a quality in the range of
available quality in the market. We define the demand function as Equation (4.2):
Di(p1, p2, ..., pm) =
θ∗i − θ∗i−1
∆θ
where θ∗i =
pi+1−pi
qi+1−qi .
The profit function for broker Bi who buys services from service provider Sk is also
given as Equation (4.6). In this cooperative game, when two brokers cooperate, we assume
that they maximize the summation of their profits, i.e., Πi+j = Πi + Πj .
5.1.1 Sharing proportional to demand
One way of sharing the profit between cooperative brokers is to divide it proportional to
the demand that each broker supports, i.e., Πi = Πi+j × DiDi+Dj .
Though this strategy seems to be fair, it leads to more competition and less profit. This
is because, in this setting, each of cooperating brokers wants to have more share of the
market (demand) to gain more profit. Although the cooperating brokers want to maximize
their total profit, since each of them wants to maximize its own revenue as well, this leads
to a more competitive market and much lower prices compared to the non-cooperative
market. In the end, at steady state, the profit that each broker gains is less than that under
the non-cooperative game. Therefore, it is not rational for brokers to cooperate under this
policy.
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Figure 5·1: Profit of brokers in cooperative & non-coperative cases, for
varying q2.
5.1.2 Sharing proportional to profit at optimal point of non-cooperative game
The other way of splitting the profit between cooperating brokers is to share it proportional
to their profit at the optimal solution of the non-cooperative game. This policy also gives
more incentive to the broker that gains more from cooperation. So, for cooperating broker
Bi, the profit is calculated by:
Πi = Πi+j × Π
′
i
Π′i + Π
′
j
where Π′i and Π
′
j are non-cooperation profits at equilibrium. To find the optimal price, like
the non-cooperative game, every broker Bi solves ∂Πi/∂pi = 0. The game in the second
stage, between service providers, is again a Bertrand competition and follows the same
settings as we discussed in Section 4.1.
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Figure 5·2: Price of brokers in cooperative & non-coperative cases, for
varying q2.
5.2 Experimental Results
We consider two different settings with 3 brokers and 4 brokers. In both settings, the
first and last brokers are in the market with the lowest and highest quality of service,
respectively, and the other brokers enter the market with a quality between them. We
study the effect of cooperation between different brokers on brokers’ utility as well as
users’ utility. In the following subsections, we start with our main observations followed
by a detailed analysis of our results.
5.2.1 Three Brokers
We consider a setting with 3 brokers, where B1 and B3 are in the market with lowest and
highest quality of services, which in this case are q1 = 10 and q3 = 120, and B2 is en-
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Figure 5·3: Profit of service providers in cooperative & non-coperative
cases, for varying q2.
tering the market. The demand function is defined like in the non-cooperative game, as
well as the profit function for providers and brokers. Assuming B2 picks a quality that
maximizes its profit (q2 = 65; see Figure 5·1), the profit of brokers in the non-cooperative
game at equilibrium is Π1 = 720, Π2 = 394 and Π3 = 121. We assume that the cooper-
ating brokers share their total profit proportional to these profits. There are two different
cooperation scenarios for broker B2: one is cooperation with B1, and the other is cooper-
ation with B3. We analyze both cases to see how prices and profits change for brokers and
providers.
B1 and B2 Cooperate
Observation 5.1. If broker B2 picks a quality close to B1, all players can offer their
services at higher prices and make more profits.
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Observation 5.2. While all players in the market benefit from the cooperation of B1 and
B2, customers pay much higher prices for the same or lower quality services, compared
to the non-cooperative game.
When B1 and B2 cooperate, if B2 chooses quality q2 closer to q1, they can offer
their services at higher prices and make a significantly larger profit compared to the non-
cooperative game. In this case, other players, including B3, S1 and S2, can also offer their
services at higher prices, therefore the market is equilibrated at higher prices. If broker
B2 picks a service with higher quality, i.e., gets closer to the quality of broker B3, the
competition between B2 and B3 gets more serious. Consequently, B2 should set its price
in a lower range, and so other players should do the same. The closer q2 gets to q3, the
competition gets more tense and the prices get closer to the prices in the non-cooperative
game. The left plots in Figures 5·1 and 5·2 present the profit and price of brokers, and Fig-
ure 5·3 shows the price of providers, when B1 and B2 cooperate. The plots in the center
illustrate the non-cooperative competition. As we observe in Figure 5·1, the optimal point
for broker B2 is at quality q2 = 13 where its profit is maximized. As Figure 5·4 shows,
since broker B1 has the lowest quality and price, it does not lose its share of the market.
B2 and B3 Cooperate
Observation 5.3. B2 cannot pick a quality close to B3, nor they can set their prices as
high as the prices in the B1-B2 cooperation.
Observation 5.4. At the optimal point for B2 and B3, while they make more profit, they
also offer their services at lower prices, compared to the equilibrium point of the non-
cooperative market. The profit comes mostly from reducing the cost of obtaining the ser-
vice from lower-level providers.
In the case of collaboration between B2 and B3, unlike the collaboration of B1 and
B2, if B2 picks a quality close to q3, they cannot set high prices, otherwise no one would
prefer to buy from B3 and broker B3 is out of market. Therefore, the prices are close to
those of the non-cooperative market. On the other hand, if broker B2 chooses a lower
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Figure 5·4: Demand of brokers in cooperative & non-coperative cases, for
varying q2.
quality with fair difference from q3, it gets into competition with broker B1. Therefore, in
this collaboration game, the prices cannot be set too high, because either it causes broker
B3 to get out of the market, or B2 and B1 get into competition to increase their share of
the market. However, in this setting, the price of service providers is lower than that of
the non-cooperative game. This is because the prices chosen by B2 and B3 lead them to
less demand, and consequently less demand for S2 as well (right side plots in Figures 5·4
and 5·5). This situation makes S2 lower its price to attract more demand, which makes S1
pick a lower price as well. The best strategy for B2 and B3 is to buy from different service
providers, so force them into more competition. Also, the optimal quality for broker B2 is
at the highest quality in which buying from S1 still has less cost than buying from S2. At
this quality, the providers’ prices equilibrate at the lowest range and brokers can benefit
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Figure 5·5: Demand of brokers in cooperative & non-coperative cases, for
varying q2.
from that.
Table 5.1 presents the prices and profits of brokers and service providers at the quality
of q2 in which the profit of broker B2 is optimized, in different situations, i.e., in the
non-cooperative case and in the case of cooperation of B2 with B1 or B3. It also shows
the percentages of change compared to the non-cooperative values. For the price and
profit of broker B2, since the optimal quality q2 changes in different situations, the shown
percentages are based on changes per unit of quality. As we observe it Table 5.1, every
player benefits from cooperation of B1 and B2 by setting a higher price. However, in
the case of collaboration between B2 and B3, only B2, B3 and S1 have a higher profit
compared to the non-cooperative case, but it is better economically for customers as prices
are lower.
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Non-Cooperative B1 & B2Cooperate
B2 & B3
Cooperate
q2∗ 65 13 43
p1 2840 6761 138% 1522 −46.5%
p2 4664 6907 640% 2711 −13%
p3 8338 12520 50% 7199 −14%
Π1 720 2373 229% 512 −29%
Π2 394 1299 229% 969 145%
Π3 121 1021 743% 286 136%
r1 2974 3099 4% 856 −72%
r2 3446 4428 28% 1678 −52%
U1 403 688 69% 472 16%
U2 2737 3082 12% 919 −66%
Table 5.1: Prices and profits of brokers and service providers in optimal
quality q2 in different scenarios and percentages of changes compare to
non-cooperative case.
5.2.2 Four Brokers
Table 5.1 presents the prices and profits of brokers and service providers at the quality
of q2 in which the profit of broker B2 is optimized, in different situations, i.e., in the
non-cooperative case and in the case of cooperation of B2 with B1 or B3. It also shows
the percentages of change compared to the non-cooperative values. For the price and
profit of broker B2, since the optimal quality q2 changes in different situations, the shown
percentages are based on changes per unit of quality. As we observe it Table 5.1, every
player benefits from cooperation of B1 and B2 by setting a higher price. However, in
the case of collaboration between B2 and B3, only B2, B3 and S1 have a higher profit
compared to the non-cooperative case, but it is better economically for customers as prices
are lower.
We consider the market in different situations where there is no cooperation, or there
is cooperation between B1 and B2, B2 and B3, or B3 and B4.
B1 and B2 cooperate
Observation 5.5. When α is small, i.e., q1 and q2 are close to each other, B1 and B2 can
offer their services at higher prices and make more profit.
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Figure 5·6: Price of brokers in cooperative & non-coperative cases, for
varying α.
Observation 5.6. When the structure of the brokers’ market imposes a tense competition
in the service providers’ market, brokers and customers benefit from this competition;
while brokers make profit as a result of decrease in the cost of buying services, customers
buy services from brokers at lower prices.
In this setting, when the qualities of service of B1 and B2 are close to each other, they
can set a high price for their services. Other brokers also raise their prices. AsB2 increases
its quality q2, and q2 and q3 get closer to each other, the price of brokers drops. But the drop
in prices of B3 and B4 is more than that of B1 and B2’s. Indeed, B1 and B2 make profit
by having higher prices, compared to the non-cooperative game, while prices of B3 and
B4 are even lower than their prices in the non-cooperative game (Figure 5·6 up right plot);
B3 and B4 make more profit by attracting more demand, which is also the case for service
provider S2. As the price of S2 decreases and B2 picks a higher quality, the competition
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Figure 5·7: Price of providers in cooperative & non-coperative cases, for
varying α.
between S1 and S2 gets more intense and they decrease their prices (Figure 5·7). This
situation holds until B2 switches from S1 to S2. Figure 5·8 shows the profit of brokers in
the non-cooperative game and under this B1-B2 cooperation.
B2 and B3 cooperate
Observation 5.7. While quality differentiation between competitors is not large, the effect
of competition outweighs the effect of cooperation.
In the case of cooperation of B2 and B3, when α is small, i.e. q2 is close to q1 and q3
is close to q4, B2 and B3 are in high competition with B1 and B4, respectively; therefore,
their cooperation have almost no effect on the system and the prices are almost the same as
the non-cooperative game (Figure 5·6 down left plot). As α gets bigger, i.e. q2 and q3 get
closer to each other, the competition with their rivals is less intense and they can set their
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Figure 5·8: Profit of brokers in non-cooperative game and B1-B2 cooper-
ation game, for varying α.
price to a higher value and the market is equilibrated at higher prices. Figure 5·9 compares
the brokers’ profit in the non-cooperative game and under this B2-B3 cooperation setting.
B3 and B4 cooperate
Observation 5.8. When B3 and B4 cooperate, as α increases, as long as B3 is not in
competition with B2, their total profit remains high.
In this configuration, when α is small, i.e. q3 and q4 are close to each other, B3 and B4
can set their price to higher values, but their prices are not as high as B1 and B2 set in their
cooperation (compared to the non-cooperative case); otherwise B4 is out of the market.
As α increases, unlike the other cooperations, the total profit of B3 and B4 remains high.
This is because when α increases, the quality differentiation between B1 and B2 increases
and they can then increase their prices. Meanwhile, the quality differentiation between
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Figure 5·9: Profit of brokers in non-cooperative game and B2-B3 cooper-
ation game, for varying α.
B3 and B4 also increases and they can attract more share of the market. When q3 gets
closer to q2 and there is more competition between B2 and B3, the prices and profits get
closer to those in the non-cooperative game. Figure 5·10 shows the brokers’ profit in the
non-cooperative game and the B3-B4 cooperation game.
Users’ Utility
Observation 5.9. Customers’ welfare is higher when competition is tough.
Observation 5.10. If brokers can impose more competition on the lower-level providers,
both brokers and customers benefit from that competition.
To compare the customers’ welfare in different cases, we calculate the summation of
users’ utility (θqi − pi) and normalize it by dividing by maximum total utility, which is
obtained when all customers buy service from the highest quality broker (B4 in this case)
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eration game, for varying α.
at zero price. Also, we define a fairness metric as (
∑
Di)
2
n×∑D2i , where Di is the demand of
broker i and n is the number of brokers. This metric shows us how evenly the market
share is distributed among brokers. Specifically, this fairness metric approaches 1 when
demands are equal, and approaches zero otherwise (Jain et al., 1984). Figure 5·11 presents
the customers’ welfare in different games with or without cooperation, for two different
markets with different quality ranges, where in the left plot q4 = 120 and in the right plot
q4 = 150. For the non-cooperative game, when α is small, the competition of B1-B2 and
B3-B4 is intense and their prices are low, so users benefit from this competition. The same
story is true for B2-B3 cooperation, when α is small; however, when q2 and q3 get close to
each other, the users’ welfare is less than that in other games. As we can see in Figure 5·11,
B1-B2 cooperation game has the lowest users’ welfare, except for some values of α, when
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Figure 5·11: Normalized total customers’ welfare in non-cooperative &
cooperative games, for varying α.
B2 buys service from S1, and there is intensive competition between S1 and S2. In this
situation, as we explained above (for B1-B2 cooperation), S2 and consequently B3 and B4
make more profit by attracting more market demand instead of by setting higher prices,
therefore the users’ welfare can be higher than other cases.
Figure 5·12 shows the fairness measure of market share for brokers. It is clear that
when there is no cooperation and brokers have a fair difference between their service
qualities, and also there is competition between service providers (B1 and B2 buy from
S1, and B3 and B4 buy from S2), the market is almost evenly shared among brokers.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
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In this thesis, we focused on two problem related to cloud and internet service man-
agements.
In the first part, we analyzed the CPU and memory usage of jobs separately and as
a joint distribution, using real data from Google data-centers. Our marginal models of
individual process attributes (like CPU and memory) have better fidelity than those used
previously. We obtained this improvement by employing a more flexible distribution than
those previously considered, namely the Burr XII distribution. This distribution allows
for both decreasing and “Bell” shapes, and as such is far more versatile than the Pareto
distributions that have been used to date in the literature. Although the larger number of
estimated parameters makes the problem more complicated, the increased fidelity makes
this extra complexity worthwhile.
We then leveraged this accuracy in modeling marginal distributions to create the first
effective joint distribution of data-center demand across multiple attributes, in our case
CPU and memory. We have shown that basic Archimedean copulae, specifically the Frank
and Clayton, can be used to great effect in modeling the “coupling” structure between the
attributes of computational processes in distribution.
Then, by putting both our Burr XII marginal models and our Frank/Clayton copula
models together, we obtain a model of the full joint distribution across attributes. Because
the marginals can be fit separately from the copula, computing MLE estimates to instan-
tiate the model on novel data is very straightforward, and especially so, as the copula has
only a single parameter to find.
Understanding multivariate resource usage distributions is critical to creating better re-
source allocation and scheduling algorithms for large computing centers. While the focus
of existing studies has only been on univariate resource usage, mainly on CPU runtime
or memory usage, understanding the dependency structure between resources will greatly
aid performance of resource management tools and decisions. Future work in this area
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may wish to study other resources like disk and network I/O. Our framework is directly
applicable to multivariate models of degree greater than the two used here, making such
expansion straightforward where data is available.
Having the demand model is crucial for provisioning the configuration of VMs or
quality of service (QoS) to optimize the profit of providers. In the second part of thesis,
we turned to pricing problem in a layered market. We developed a game-theoretic model
that captures the interaction among players in a multi-level market.
In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between users and service providers, adapt
the quality of the service that they get from lower-level providers so as to attract more
customers and maximize their profit. The game consists of two service providers, two,
three or four brokers, and users, though we study more extensively the case with two
brokers.
Numerical results show that the more differentiation between the quality of service
offered by brokers, the higher is their profit. However in some situations, besides quality
differentiation, cost plays an important role and forces brokers to compromise on quality
differentiation with their competitors to reduce cost and make more profit. An interesting
result in the two brokers game is that although players compete for more profit, the com-
petition only affects their market share; the profit increases for one player if it increases
for the other one. But this is not the case for more brokers. When there are more than two
brokers, the market is more competitive and brokers should offer their services at lower
prices to be able to stay in the market.
We also studied situations where all brokers prefer to buy service from just one of
the lower-level providers, i.e., the providers’ market is about to become a monopoly. We
developed a Bertrand game with price constraints to keep the market as an oligopoly if
possible. Moreover, for the two brokers game, we explored the case where customers
buy the service only if the combination of price-quality has positive utility for them. In
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this situation, players (brokers) try to offer the service cheaper to attract more customers.
Unlike the unconstrained utility game with two brokers, if profit increases for one player,
profit decreases for the other player.
In the other part of the study, we considered a partial cooperative game where incoming
brokers decide to cooperate with one of the brokers in the market; in this game, coopera-
tive players maximize their total profit instead of their own profit. The numerical results
show that in most of the cases, all players benefit from the cooperation of a subset of play-
ers; indeed, cooperation means less competition. However, the benefit from cooperation
depends on the quality differentiation between cooperating brokers and also the quality
differentiation of cooperating brokers with other brokers they compete with. The highest
profit occurs when the service qualities of coopering brokers are close to each other, with
a substantial quality difference from other brokers. Also, players make more profit when
the incoming broker cooperates with the broker with lowest quality rather than cooperates
with the broker with highest quality; in cooperation with the high quality broker, if they
set their price too high, the high quality broker loses its market share and goes out of the
market. Furthermore, when the service quality offered by brokers is distributed almost
uniformly, the cooperation does not have much impact on the market.
Although in most cooperative settings, customers do not benefit from brokers’ coop-
eration, there are situations where cooperation can yield lower prices. In these cases, the
combination of brokers’ service quality and their market shares impose a high competition
on the service providers’ level, and as a result of such competition, they lower their price.
Consequently, the cost of providing services is reduced for brokers and they can make
more profit by incurring less cost.
For the future research, one direction is to extend the market in the provider level to
more than two providers. Also, the market can be extended hierarchically; for example
we can consider content provider competition on top of the market. Also applying more
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realistic model for the customers demand and cost function and also considering the supply
constraint for providers will capture the complex relationships and industry structures that
exist in the real Internet. Another interesting problem is to combine the pricing problem
and the demand model for provisioning the optimal-revenue configuration for the cloud
VM’s and also service quality in the Internet market.
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